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ABSTRACT
Presidential approval ratings are a political resource that presidents and their advisors hope to
influence through strategic action in order to achieve their policy goals (McAvoy 2008, 284).
Through 1999, scholarly literature had largely ignored the president’s use of unilateral powers.
Since Moe and Howell (1999a, 1999b), however, the literature on the unilateral presidency has
expanded rapidly. Despite the rapid growth of literature examining the unilateral presidency, and
45 years of presidential approval ratings literature, literature examining the link between the
president’s use of unilateral powers and subsequent presidential approval ratings is virtually
nonexistent. Existing research has not statistically examined what effect, if any, the president’s
issuing executive orders has on subsequent job approval ratings. This thesis seeks to address that
research gap. By modeling aggregate and individual-level presidential approval ratings, using
fixed-effect models, OLS regression, and binary logistic regression, this thesis finds evidence
indicating the president’s issuing of executive orders has a negative impact on the subsequent
presidential job approval ratings that individuals report. If an executive order is salient to the
public, presidents receive lower presidential approval ratings from persons of all political parties;
however, if the executive order is non-salient then presidents only receive lower presidential
approval ratings from members of their own political party. Members of the opposition party
report higher presidential approval ratings when the president issued non-salient executive
orders. Thus, this thesis concludes that the president’s issuing of executive orders has significant
effects on subsequent presidential job approval ratings, and future research should be conducted
to explore this relationship further.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
“And that’s why, today, I’m beginning a new effort to fix as much of our immigration
system as I can on my own, without Congress.”
“I have also directed Secretary Johnson and Attorney General Holder to identify
additional actions my administration can take on our own, within my existing legal
authorities, to do what Congress refuses to do and fix as much of our immigration system
as we can.”
President Barack Obama, June 30, 2014 (Office of the Press Secretary 2014).
Frustrated with a deadlocked Congress on immigration reform, and fearing the further growth of
an ever-deepening humanitarian crisis on the border, President Obama decided to act unilaterally
to do what Congress could not or would not do. President Obama is only one of many presidents
who have increasingly decided to act unilaterally after facing a hostile or deadlocked Congress.
Increasingly presidents have used executive orders to obtain their national or foreign policy goals
(Moe and Howell 1999a, 1999b). By using executive orders to circumvent Congress, presidents
are able to use only one of their many tools to act unilaterally.1
Through 1999, scholarly literature had largely ignored the use of unilateral powers by
presidents. Since Moe and Howell (1999a, 1999b); however, the literature on the unilateral
presidency has expanded rapidly. Despite the rapid growth of the literature examining the
unilateral presidency, and 45 years of presidential approval ratings literature; literature
examining the link between the president’s use of unilateral powers and subsequent presidential
approval ratings is virtually nonexistent. Existing research has not statistically examined what
effect, if any, issuing executive orders have on a president’s approval ratings. Some studies
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Other tools include executive agreements, proclamations, national security directives,
memoranda, and signing statements (Howell 2005).
1

suggest an implicit negative relationship between presidential approval ratings and executive
orders (see Mayer and Price 2002; Ouyang 2012). This thesis proposes a theory and a set of
hypotheses, tested at the aggregate and individual-level, positing a negative relationship between
the number of executive orders that a president issues and their subsequent presidential job
approval ratings.
The next section of this chapter is a discussion of the central theory and hypotheses of
this thesis. This chapter then concludes with two sections discussing some of the important
expected findings of this thesis.

1.1

Theory and Hypotheses

As previously discussed, literature studying the relationship between executive orders
and presidential approval is not extensive, and studies examining the effect executive orders has
on presidential approval ratings (if any) are non-existent. Ouyang (2012) reports presidents are
constrained in the number of executive orders that they can issue because of diffuse support
approval ratings at an aggregate level; they fear issuing too many executive orders may lower
diffuse support presidential approval ratings. Although Ouyang (2012) does not discuss why
presidents fear issuing too many executive orders and how this lowers diffuse support
presidential approval ratings, I theorize this is the case because a majority of the public does not,
generally, approve of the president’s acting unilaterally in the form of executive orders and
issuing executive orders may lower presidential approval ratings in the aggregate. Members of
the public may disapprove of the use of executive orders because executive orders often bypass
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Congress (Howell 2005), or members of the public may disapprove of the president’s acting
unilaterally for ideological differences (discussed more below).
Ouyang (2012) argues presidents constrain themselves because the use of executive
orders may lower the level of diffuse support the institution currently enjoys by negatively
affecting the president’s “image” in the public’s view, and, during times of high diffuse support,
presidents would not want to do this (Ouyang 2012, 11). There is a strong link between
presidential job approval ratings and a president’s “image” (McAvoy 2008). McAvoy (2008)
reports that Gallup’s presidential approval question is unable to differentiate between “image” or
“surface” and “substance” or “depth,” and, therefore, anything that affects a president’s image
also affects their presidential job approval ratings (McAvoy 2008, 296).2 If the president’s image
is lowered because the public reacts negatively to the use of unilateral powers by the president in
the form of issuing executive orders, as I theorize, then presidential approval ratings may also act
accordingly.
Reeves and Rogowski (2016a), using five national representative surveys conducted
between 2013 and 2015, report that public support for direct unilateral power use, through
executive orders, is low but conditioned by context (148). The public generally disapproves of
direct unilateral action; however, if the president acts unilaterally for the sake of national security
or because Congress is in a state of gridlock approval for unilateral power use increases by 20
percentage points (Reeves and Rogowski 2016a, 148). Reeves and Rogowski’s (2016a) findings
are consistent with my theory and hypothesis in that the public disapproves of the president

2

Gallup presidential job approval question asks: “Do you approve or disapprove of the way [first
and last name] is handling his job as President?”
3

acting unilaterally. In general, the public demonstrates low levels of approval for unilateral
actions (including executive orders); accordingly, executive orders should be negatively
associated with presidential job approval ratings. If the public generally disapproves of unilateral
power use (including issuing executive orders) by the president as Reeves and Rogowski (2016a)
report, and my theory and hypotheses posit, then issuing executive orders may have a negative
impact on presidential job approval ratings.
As discussed previously, I theorize the majority of the public, in general, disapproves of
the president’s acting unilaterally by issuing executive orders. Because of this, I hypothesize:
H1: There is a negative relationship between the number of executive orders that a
president issues and subsequent presidential job approval ratings, ceteris paribus.
Ouyang (2012) also discusses the relative saliency of executive orders and how non-salient and
salient executive orders have different effects on diffuse support approval ratings. Using a
dataset on significant executive orders (collected by Howell 2003, 2005), Ouyang (2012)
considers an executive order salient when it is non-ceremonial3 and featured on the front page of
The New York Times. 4 Because not all executive orders may be salient to the public, I
hypothesize:

As Howell (2005) notes, sometimes executive orders appear on the front page of The New York
Times that do not include any policy content. These “ceremonial” executive orders are not
included among the data analyzed in this study. Only executive orders that include policy
content are analyzed presently.
4
As Howell (2005) notes, virtually all page one stories carry over to other sections of the paper.
Therefore, as long as the article discussing the executive order begins on the front page, it is
defined as a salient executive order. Howell (2005) divides these salient executive orders into
mentions of executive orders in the first 10 paragraphs only (the front page only), and mentions
of executive orders that started on the front page. For the purpose of this paper, I consider an
executive order as salient as long as the article began on the front page.
3

4

H2: Salient executive orders will have a greater negative effect on presidential job
approval ratings than will non-salient executive orders, ceteris paribus.
Bond and Fleisher (2001), and Lebo and Cassino (2007) find evidence indicating partisan
identity has a large effect on presidential job approval ratings. Respondents belonging to the
same party affiliation as the president approve of the president’s job performance more than
respondents belonging to different party affiliations. I hypothesize:
H3: The negative relationship between the numbers of executive orders that a president
issues and subsequent presidential job approval ratings holds for respondents belonging
to all party affiliations, ceteris paribus; however, this negative relationship is less strong
for persons belonging to the same political party as the president than is negative
relationship for persons belonging to some other party, ceteris paribus.
If my theory that the majority of the public, in general, disapproves of the president’s acting
unilaterally in the form of issuing executive orders is empirically supported, then I expect to find
evidence indicating support for Hypothesis 3. Hypotheses 1 and 2 are tested in Chapters 3 and 4
on aggregate- and individual-level models. Hypothesis 3 can only be tested in Chapter 4 at an
individual-level due to data constraints that are discussed in Chapter 3. The next two sections of
this chapter discusses expected findings for each section.

1.2

Aggregate-Level Model Expected Findings

Presidential job approval ratings are largely a function of previous presidential job
approval ratings (Hibbs 1977; Nicholson, Segura, and Woods 2002; Burden and Mughan 2003;
Geys and Vermeir 2008; Newman and Forcehimes 2010; Fauvelle-Aymar and Stegmair 2013).
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Therefore, because presidential job approval ratings in one month are largely a function of
previous monthly approval ratings, I expect to find previous presidential approval ratings will
largely impact current presidential approval ratings. I expect to find previously low approval
ratings are related to low current approval ratings, and previously high approval ratings are
related to higher current approval ratings (Expected Finding 3.1 [EF 3.1]). This is, thus, likely
some sort of autoregressive function describing the relationship here between past and present
levels of presidential job approval.
Fauvelle-Aymar and Stegmair (2013) tells us that the national economy, and specifically
the stock market, are valid indicators of the economic well-being of the country at an aggregatelevel. They find that the president is rewarded, in the form of higher presidential approval
ratings, when the national economy is performing well; when the economy is performing poorly,
the president is punished in the form of comparatively lower presidential approval ratings.
Therefore, I expect to find evidence indicating presidential approval ratings are significantly
associated with changes in the stock market. Increases in the stock market will be related to
higher presidential job approval ratings, and decreases in stock market indices should be related
to lower presidential job approval ratings (EF 3.2).
Presidents are more able to credibly pass blame to other political actors more during
times of divided government than they are during times of unified government (Nicholson,
Segura, and Woods 2002). Because of this, I expect to find that during times of divided
government, presidential job approval ratings will be comparatively higher than such ratings
during times of unified government (EF 3.3). Jones (2014), and nearly every presidential
approval rating study since Mueller (1970, 1973), have reported presidents receive higher
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approval ratings during their first six months in office (honeymoon period). Therefore, I expect
to find evidence indicating presidents observe significantly higher approval ratings during their
first six months in office than they do during the rest of their time in office (EF 3.4). Thus, the
issuance of executive orders during the “honeymoon period" should have a lesser statistically
significant and negative effect on presidential approval ratings during this period, than issuing
executive orders would have outside of the “honeymoon period”.

1.3

Individual-Level Model Expected Findings

As previously discussed, Bond and Fleisher (2001), and Lebo and Cassino (2007) find
evidence indicating partisan identity has a large effect on presidential job approval ratings.
Individuals belonging to the same political party of the president approve of the president’s job
performance at higher levels comparatively than respondents belonging to different political
parties. Therefore, I expect to find (Expected Finding 4.1 [EF 4.1]) that in comparing
individuals, those who belong to the same political party as the president will be more likely to
approve of the president than will those individuals who belong to a different political party than
the president (Bond and Fleisher 2001; Lebo and Cassino 2007).
Brody (1991) notes that aggregate-level studies of presidential approval ratings often
“assume that individuals: (1) receive evidence about the performance of the economy, (2) judge
this evidence against some benchmark, and (3) blame or credit the president for the condition of
the economy” (Bond and Fleisher 2001, 530). Unfortunately, this assumption may not always be
empirically valid, because it assumes that individuals receive and are able to process information
about the state of the economy. To test the effects of the economy on individuals, Bond and
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Fleisher (2001) and Clarke et al. (2005) suggest that at an individual-level it is more valid to ask
respondents about their retrospective and prospective assessments of the condition of the
economy. Following the advice of Bond and Fleisher (2001) and Clarke et al. (2005), I use
retrospective and prospective assessments in the individual-level models detailed in Chapter 5;
therefore, I expect to find in comparing individuals, those with positive retrospective and
prospective assessments of the state of the economy will be more likely to approve of the
president than will those individuals who hold negative retrospective and prospective
assessments of the state of the economy (EF 4.2).
As discussed in more detail in Chapter 5, my individual-level models also include
variables controlling for divided government; therefore, I expect to find evidence indicating that
during times of divided government, presidential job approval ratings are comparatively higher
than presidential job approval ratings during times of unified government (EF 4.3).
Extant essays examining the “gender gap” report that differences exist between men and
women in terms of how they approve or disapprove of political actors and actions; however,
scholarly literature on presidential approval ratings has largely ignored these differences (Clarke
et al. 2005). Clarke et al. (2005) argue that it is important for analyst to consider the gender gap
when examining presidential approval ratings; because, by “assuming homogeneity between men
and women in the forces driving approval ratings,” researchers may report spurious estimates
(Clarke et al. 2005, 31). I expect to find evidence indicating support for a “gender gap”, or more
specifically, evidence indicating women are more likely to approve of Democratic Party
presidents than they are of Republican Party presidents, and men are be more likely to approve
of Republican Party presidents than they are of Democratic Party presidents (EF 4.4).
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
Scholarly literature on executive orders and presidential approval ratings is not extensive.
In fact, it seems no study has ever been published examining the relationship between those
variables by any social science journal or publisher. Literature on the president’s use of unilateral
powers has become abundant in the last two decades (Howell 2005); literature on presidential job
approval ratings is no less abundant (Gronke and Newman 2003). However, it seems no
published study has examined the relationship between the two concepts. Ouyang (2012) is the
only existing study (published or not) that has examined this relationship. 5
Ouyang (2012) argues presidents are constrained in the number of executive orders that
they issue by public opinion – in that they issue differing numbers of executive orders during
times of high and low levels of presidential approval. Using American National Election Study
(ANES) surveys (1981-2001), he finds evidence to show that presidents will issue fewer
executive orders during times of high diffuse support (support for the presidential institution as a
whole); and more such orders during times of low diffuse support, but the level of diffuse
support only constrains non-salient executive orders (executive orders of which the public is
unaware). Ouyang argues that this relationship exists because presidents prefer to not use
executive orders during times of high diffuse support. Because their use can lead to lower diffuse
support levels if Congress or the Supreme Court overturn the executive order. Issuing executive
orders can also sour relations between the president and Congress, and this may affect diffuse

5

Ouyang (2012) was not published in a professional journal; however, it was selected to be
presented at the 2012 American Political Science Association Conference (the conference was
cancelled before Ouyang (2012) could be presented due to Hurricane Isaac).
9

support negatively. Finally, executive orders can also harm the president’s image, thus lowering
diffuse support (Ouyang 2012, 11).6
Jones (2014), similar to Ouyang (2012), examined the relationship between executive
orders and presidential approval ratings; however, Jones (2014) found no relationship between
the two concepts. Jones (2014) used a newly-created dataset to model aggregate level
presidential job approval ratings from 1969 to 2012. The study found that the only statistically
significant predictors of presidential job approval ratings at an aggregate level were previous
presidential job approval ratings and presidential honeymoon periods (i.e., the six months
immediately following a president’s inauguration). As an explanatory variable, executive orders
failed to achieve statistical significance. Jones (2014) hypothesized this to be the case because
the public, despite frequent attempts by the media to make executive orders a salient issue, does
not attend to the president’s use executive orders, because the majority of the public is generally
politically unaware of the executive orders. Unfortunately, Jones (2014) did not analyze
individual-level data, and the study was only intended to operate as a gateway to future research
on this subject. Jones’s (2014) study may have suffered from a number of problems, including
using only aggregate-level data; and not differentiating between salient and non-salient executive
orders.
Because Ouyang (2012) and Jones (2014) are the only existing studies to test the
relationship between executive orders and public opinion, it is necessary to examine both types

6

Ouyang (2012) assumes that an executive order the public does not like can harm a president’s
diffuse support. This presupposes a negative relationship between executive orders and diffuse
support. This thesis argues a similar negative relationship exist between executive orders and
specific support (support for specific presidents, as opposed to support for the presidency as a
whole).
10

of studies (executive orders and presidential approval rating literatures) separately to specify the
models estimated in this paper.

2.1

The Unilateral Presidency

Studies on unilateral powers were published before 1999; however, it was not until Moe
and Howell’s studies (1999a, 1999b) that the extant literature began to focus on a theory of
presidential use of unilateral powers. Moe and Howell (1999a, 1999b) argue that a president’s
power to act unilaterally exists specifically because these powers were not enumerated in the
Constitution; and, because of this, Congress or the courts are unlikely to restrict unilateral power.
These powers have grown over time because presidents are motivated to enhance their legacy
and, to do so, requires power. Accordingly, at the very least, no matter their other intentions,
presidents are motivated to enhance their own power (Moe and Howell 1999a, 1999b).
Moe and Howell (1999a, 1999b) argue that although presidents are motivated to enhance
their own power, they cannot extend this power too greatly or too rapidly without facing
constraints. Congress, the courts and, to a much lesser extent, the public constrain presidents,
because Congress can draft legislation against a particular executive order, and the Supreme
Court can invalidate particular executive orders. Thus, presidents must be strategic about the
times during which they can safely enhance their power without potentially harming their longterm legacy (Moe and Howell 1999a, 138).
Since Moe and Howell (1999a, 1999b) studies of unilateral power have expanded in
number. Deering and Maltzman (1999) report that presidents use executive orders to bypass
Congress, but only when presidents think the Congress will not overturn the executive order by
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legislating to contravene the president’s policy goal. Mayer and Price (2002) find that presidents
use executive orders to affect significant policy change and to send strategic signals to other
actors in the political system, such as members of Congress. Cooper (2001) argues that
sometimes presidents use executive memoranda (a type of executive action by presidents that is
similar to executive orders, but are not published in the Federal Register) (Cooper 2001, 128)
instead of executive orders to confuse others in the policy making arena, even though the use of
an executive order would be more direct (Cooper 2001, 140). Because the Federal Register Act
governs executive orders, but not memoranda (Cooper 2001, 128), presidents may issue an
executive order that is a public record, but also issue a memorandum that is not a public record to
conceal pertinent information about the executive order, which can lead to confusion among
other political actors outside of the executive branch (Cooper 2001, 138). Howell and Lewis
(2002) find that presidents reorganize and create executive branch organizations to minimize
congressional ability to constrain the president and to maximize their own ability to control these
agencies, thus enhancing their own unilateral power.
More recently, Fine and Warber (2012) find that presidents issue three different types of
executive orders (major, routine, and symbolic), and previous research has not sufficiently
distinguished these types of executive orders. Symbolic executive orders are executive orders
that do not have any implications on policy, or executive agency management. Most symbolic
executive orders are used to honor dead presidents or to create seals and medals (Fine and
Warber 2012, 262). Routine executive orders are executive orders that, “do not drastically depart
from existing or newly created policies enacted by Congress” (Fine and Warber 2012, 262).
These are executive orders that are designed to carry out the intent of Congress (Warber 2006,
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141). Major executive orders are executive orders that create significant and substantive public
policies that depart from the “original intent of Congress” (Warber 2006, 143). Fine and Warber
(2012) find that symbolic and routine executive orders are more likely to be issued during times
of unified government and when Congress is ideologically proximate to the president. During
times of divided government, presidents are more likely to issue major executive orders because
their legislative preferences diverge from those of Congress (272). Thus, Fine and Warber (2012)
conclude that divided and unified government play important roles in the type of executive
orders that presidents issue.
Most unilateral power research attempts to explain the conditions in which presidents act
unilaterally and why; however, recent research by Warber (2014), and Rottinghaus and Warber
(2015) have focused on how presidents use their unilateral powers to target specific
constituencies to potentially enhance their own approval ratings with those constituencies.
Warber (2014), argues unilateral power literature often assumes executive orders are
solely directed at the bureaucratic offices that make up the executive branch, however, this
assumption is not entirely correct. Warber (2014) hypothesizes that presidents may issue
executive orders that are directed at specific interests. Using the same executive orders
classification scheme discussed previously (symbolic, routine, and major executive orders),
Warber (2014), reports that presidents do issue executive orders targeted at specific audiences.
Specifically, Democratic presidents issued nearly twice as many major executive orders per year
than Republic presidents that targeted specific interests (Warber 2014, 281). Additionally, both
parties issue more major executive orders than they do symbolic and routine executive orders
when targeting specific interests (Fine 2014, 282). Unfortunately, Warber (2014) is unable to
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address why presidents target specific interests when they issues executive orders. The author
suggest future research must be conducted to examine this question if unilateral power research
is to advance beyond explaining why presidents issues executive orders.
Expanding upon Warber (2014), Rottinghaus and Warber (2015), merge unilateral
presidency research with research on the public presidency, and identify the conditions in which
presidents can target specific groups when issuing executive orders and executive proclamations.
According to public presidency literature, presidents seek to lead and represent the public.
Rottinghaus and Warber (2015) argue that the president can seek to lead and represent the public
through unilateral directives by issuing constituency based executive orders and executive
proclamations. The authors finding suggest that presidents issue more constituency targeting
executive proclamations when Congress possesses a large majority party, or when divided
government occurs (Rottinghaus and Warber 2015, 306). The authors argue the reason for this
finding is because when institutional friction exist presidents need to appeal to their constituents
even when they may be unable to get their way in terms of substantive policy, and executive
proclamations are one way in which presidents can appeal to their constituents (Rottinghaus and
Warber 2015, 303). Rottinghaus and Warber (2015) report presidents do not issue constituency
targeting executive orders when institutional friction exists because presidents may be less
willing to issue executive orders, because executive orders have policy implications that
proclamations do not have. Presidents are more likely to issue constituency targeting executive
orders during election years, and during their first year in office (Rottinghaus and Warber 2015,
304-305). Thus, presidents issue executive orders and proclamations that target specific
constituencies in order to lead and represent the public.

14

Seeking to address a research gap in unilateral power literature – research has generally
tended to focus on the institutional and behavioral factors that influence presidential power
(Young 2013, 329) – Young (2013) studied the role natural disasters, foreign policy crises, and
economic crises has in the president’s ability to expand unilateral powers. Young (2013) argues
presidents are aware of the environment in which they operate, and will attempt to capitalize on
moments that present the largest opportunity to increase their power (348). Using negative
binomial regression, Young (2013), finds foreign policy crises present the best opportunity for
presidents to increase their power (349). Foreign policy crises were found to have a positive
statistically significant effect on presidential unilateral power. During foreign policy crises
presidential unilateral power (as measure by the number of significant executive order issued)
increased dramatically. Economic crises and natural disasters were found to have no significant
impact on unilateral power. Suggesting that presidents are unwilling or unable to enhance their
own power during economic crises and natural disasters.
A recent unilateral powers study (Reeves and Rogowski 2016a), using four nationally
representative surveys, reports that the public has low levels of support for unilateral power use,
and these mass attitudes of presidential unilateral power use are stable over time. The authors
argue that evaluations of the president are structured by citizens’ commitment to core democratic
values (Reeves and Rogowski 2016a, 27). The authors report that public support for direct
unilateral action is conditioned by context. Public support for unilateral action increases by 20
percentage points during congressional gridlock7 and when dealing with matters of national

7

Congressional gridlock occurs when Congress refuses or is unable to pass legislation.
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security (27). Surprisingly, the authors report partisanship and evaluations of the president do not
strictly shape attitudes about unilateral power use.
Reeves and Rogowski (2016b), using a series of nationally representative survey
samples, report the public is responsive to the methods in which presidents intend to use to
achieve their policy goals. In the survey, respondents reported lower approval ratings for
hypothetical presidential candidates that intended to achieve their policy goals by acting
unilaterally. Candidates that intended to achieve their policy goals by working with Congress
received higher approval ratings. By using another national representative survey that asked
respondent whether they approve or disapprove of a series of policies that presidents from
Lincoln to Obama have achieved through acting unilaterally, Reeves and Rogowski (2016b)
report that attitudes toward unilateral power shape how voters evaluate policies presidents have
achieved through unilateral means (19). Both findings suggest that the public report lower
approval ratings when presidents act unilaterally, as opposed to acting legislatively, and when
policies are achieved through acting unilaterally members of the public that do not approve of
the president acting unilaterally are less likely to support the policy. Thus, public opinion serves
as an important constraint on presidents’ use of unilateral powers (Reeves and Rogowski 2016b,
21).

2.2

The First Wave of Presidential Approval Ratings Research

Early studies, and indeed most studies, on presidential approval ratings or presidential
popularity are derived from Mueller’s (1970, 1973) seminal research. Mueller, using multiple
OLS regression and Gallup’s presidential popularity question, over a 24-year period beginning
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with the Truman administration and ending with the Johnson administration, finds four key
insights on presidential approval ratings. First, he finds statistically significant evidence
indicating president’s popularity decline over time.8 He hypothesizes this is the case because,
even if an administration acts with majority support on each issue, it can eventually alienate
enough political minorities to be defeated and, in the process, lower popularity will result
because public disillusionment with the President occurs over time. This disillusionment occurs
because presidents, while seeking election, invariably say or imply they will do more than then
they can feasibly do during their term in office (Mueller 1970, 20). Second, he finds statistically
significant evidence indicating increases in national unemployment cause the president to receive
lower approval ratings, but decreases in unemployment have no effect on presidential approval
ratings. Third, he finds evidence indicating presidential approval ratings increase during rallyaround-the-flag periods. Finally, he finds evidence indicating presidential approval ratings
decline during times of war.
Gronke and Newman (2003) report that presidential approval research has generally
advanced in three waves; with the first wave consisting of reactions to Mueller’s (1970, 1973)
seminal research (502). The first to react to Mueller (1970, 1973) was Stimson (1976). Stimson
(1976) finds that presidential popularity follows a cyclical pattern, in which presidents begin
their terms with high popularity, but experience parabolic declines, resulting in a loss of popular

8

Nearly every study dealing with presidential approval ratings recognizes a negative trend in
presidential approval ratings after a president takes office. The citations are too numerous to
include them all here. For some examples see: Stimson (1976); Kernell (1978); Monroe
(1978); Siegelman and Knight (1983); Brody (1991); Gronke and Brehm (2002); Eichenberg,
Stoll, and Lebo (2006); Beck, Carr, and Walmsley (2012); Berlemann, Enkelmann, and
Kuhlenkasper (2012); and Berlemann, and Enkelmann (2014).
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support for about three years, and then recover some at the ends of their terms. Whereas Mueller
(1970, 1973) attributed this decline to a coalition of minorities, Stimson (1976) attributed the
cyclical decline in presidential approval ratings over time to uninformed citizens having
exaggerated expectations of what the president can achieve that inevitably decline (Gronke and
Newman 2003, 502). Refuting Mueller (1973) and Stimson (1976), Kernell (1978) agrees
presidential approval ratings tend to decline over time; however, he argues that these declines
occur because of “real events and conditions,” such as the economy, wars, scandals, and
international events (Kernell 1978, 508). Similarly to Kernell (1978), Monroe (1978) reports
declines in presidential approval ratings can be attributed to changes in inflation and military
expenditures. By linking declines in presidential approval ratings to real world events, instead of
time, Kernell (1978) and Monroe (1978) ushered in the second wave of presidential approval
research (Gronke and Newman 2003, 503).

2.3

The Second Wave of Presidential Approval Ratings Research

The second wave of presidential approval research, published in the early to mid-1980s,
followed Kernell (1978) and Monroe (1978) by, “attempting to specify more realistically the
links between the economy, political events, and approval” (Gronke and Newman 2003, 503). In
an effort to make presidential approval models more realistic, researchers during the second
wave of presidential approval research, debated the merits of different: model specification, lag
structures, duration of effects, and estimation techniques (Gronke and Newman 2003, 503).
MacKuen (1983) sought to identify how long-run rally-events affected presidential approval
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ratings, while Norpoth and Yantek (1983) sought to identify how long-run economic conditions
affected approval ratings.
Two important theoretical developments mark the second wave of presidential approval
research (Gronke and Newman 2003, 504). The first important development was the rise of
research focusing on the incentives presidents have to gain and maintain approval ratings. By
focusing on the president’s incentive to maintain approval ratings, Ragsdale (1984), Ostrom and
Job (1986), and Simon and Ostrom (1989) made their models more politically focused and
realistic (Gronke and Newman 2003, 504). The second major development occurred when
researchers began to focus on individual-level models.9 Previously, when researchers applied
aggregate-level findings to individuals, they committed the ecological fallacy. By developing
individual-level models researchers were able to test theories that could not be tested at an
aggregate-level without committing that error. By using individual-level data, Ostrom and Simon
(1985) report when presidents are successful in Congress, presidential approval ratings rise
accordingly and, when presidents are less successful in the legislative arena, presidential
approval ratings fall accordingly.10

9

See: Kernell and Hibbs (1981); Kinder (1981); Hibbs, Rivers, and Vasilitos (1982a, 1982b);
Ostom and Simon (1985); and Tedin (1986).

10

For other studies linking congressional success to presidential approval ratings see Brace and
Hinckley (1992), and Cohen (2013). For studies linking presidential approval ratings to
congressional success see Rivers and Rose (1985); Rohde and Simon (1985); Peterson (1990);
Bond and Fleisher (1990); Cohen (1997); Kernell (1997); Canes-Wrong and de Marchi (2002);
and Bond, Fleisher, and Wood (2003).
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2.4

The Third Wave of Presidential Approval Ratings Research

The third, and current wave of presidential approval research, has been more diverse and
less focused in its research. Early studies primarily focused on how the media and elite discourse
shape presidential approval ratings (Gronke and Newman 2003, 504). Later studies, however,
vary widely in their focus, and thus cannot be defined by any one specific focus. Brody (1991)
reports that the media and elite discourse primarily shape public reactions of events and new
presidents through a two-step process. In the first step events are evaluated by political elites,
and then, during the second step, these evaluations are transmitted to the public via the mass
media (Brody 1991).11
Priming issues is another way in which the media shapes opinions (Miller and Krosnick
2000).12 Priming causes people to place special weight on certain issues when evaluating the
issue. When the media reports on some issues, but not others, the media primes the issues
reported on by making the primed issue more politically salient to the public. By priming an
issue the issue becomes more salient to the individual. Edwards, Mitchell, and Welch (1995) find
that saliency of issues that affect presidential approval ratings (generally) vary over time, and
that only salient issues impact presidential job approval ratings. The more salient the issue, the
more impact that it has on presidential job approval ratings. For instance, if the public perceives
the president as doing a good job handling foreign affairs, but doing poorly on the economy,
presidential job approval ratings will reflect the issue that is more publically salient. If the more

For more studies on how elite discourse and the media shape presidential approval ratings see:
West (1991); Mutz (1992, 1994); Goidel, Shields, and Peffley (1997); and Nadeau et al.
(1999).
12
For more research on priming see: Lyengar and Kinder (1987); and Krosnick and Kinder
(1990).
11
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publically salient issue is the economy, approval ratings will be low; if foreign affairs are more
salient to the public, then approval ratings should be high.
Some third wave researchers, Bond and Fleisher (2001) and Lebo and Cassino (2007)
focused their research on the widening partisan gap that exist in presidential approval ratings.
Specifying logit models from individual-level data obtained from American National Election
Surveys (ANES), Bond and Fleisher (2001) find evidence of a widening partisan gap affecting
presidential approval ratings from 1972 to 2000. Members of the public belonging to the same
political party as the president evaluate the president more positively than do members of the
opposition party. The authors hypothesize this to be the case because, “the president’s partisans
may be more likely to give him credit for a good economy and less likely to blame him for a bad
economy than opposition partisans” (Bond and Fleisher 2001, 358). Thus, presidents are more
likely to receive higher approval ratings from citizens with the same party affiliation as the
president than they are of citizens not belonging to the same party affiliation as the president.
Divided and unified government interact in theoretically interesting ways with
presidential job approval ratings. Nicholson, Segura, and Woods (2002) find that divided
government allows presidents to credibly pass blame onto other political actors, thus allowing for
higher presidential job approval ratings. This effect occurs even when controlling for wellknown predictors of approval. Thus during times of divided government, presidents may have
higher job approval ratings and issue more symbolic executive orders.
Clarke et al. (2005) highlight the importance of considering gender differences when
modeling presidential approval ratings. By disaggregating 240 monthly Survey of Consumer
datasets gathered from 1978 through 1997, Clarke et al. find evidence indicating the “gender
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gap” between men and women’s presidential approval ratings are due to differences in how both
sexes evaluate the economy and the president. Seeking to identify which type of economic
evaluation model best fits men and women, Clarke et al. (2005) find that national prospective
economic evaluation models perform the best for women, and personal prospective models work
the best for men.13 This finding suggests that men and women assess the performance of the
president by assessing the future state of the economy either for the nation (women) or for
themselves (men).14 Clarke et al. report that women’s economic evaluations were consistently
more negative than those of men, regardless of who the president was or the president’s party
affiliation (Clarke et al. 2005, 51).
Using ARFIMA methods (discussed in more detail in Chapter 4), Lebo and Cassino
(2007) continue Bond and Fleisher’s (2001) research on the presidential approval partisan gap.
They find that partisans of both parties reward and punish, in terms of approval ratings,
presidents of the opposite party on the basis of economic indicators, while remaining largely
unresponsive to those indicators when their party holds the presidency (Lebo and Cassino 2007,
740). Lebo and Cassino (2007) argue that although this finding may not be normatively
desirable, partisans are not so biased as to completely ignore bad economic indicators when their
party holds the presidency. If the economy is bad enough, partisans will respond accordingly by

National prospective models posit that individual give higher approval ratings when they
believe the economy as a whole is going to do better in the future, and lower approval ratings
when they believe the economy as whole is going to do worse in the future. Personal
prospective models posit that individual give higher approval ratings when they believe their
own personal economic situation is going to improve in the future, and lower approval ratings
when they believe their own personal economic situation is going to worsen in the future.
14
Prior to Clarke et al. many studies attempted to determine whether prospective or retrospective
perceptions of the economy performed best when modelling presidential approval ratings (e.g.,
MacKuen et al. 1992; Clarke and Stewart 1994; and Norpoth 1996).
13
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reporting lower presidential approval ratings even if they belong to the same political party as the
president.
By conducting a series of correlation tests, and creating a structural equation model to
“fully capture the interrelated nature of the personal and policy components of presidential
approval” (McAvoy 2008, 294), McAvoy demonstrates that researchers cannot safely assume
that Gallup’s presidential job approval question strictly measures job performance, because the
question also measures presidential favorability. McAvoy reports that presidential favorability
ratings measure respondents’ evaluations of a president’s character and image; and presidential
job approval ratings measures a president’s competence. McAvoy’s overall findings contribute to
the literature by highlighting the need to consider favorability ratings when trying to explain job
approval ratings, even if favorability has a comparatively lesser effect on presidential job
approval ratings than economic evaluations (297).
Newman and Forcehimes (2010) contribute to presidential approval literature by creating
a list of major events from 1953 to 2006 that may impact presidential approval ratings. They
argue that, although studies since Mueller (1970) recognize the importance of including control
variables for major events that may affect presidential approval ratings, studies often diverge in
the events that they select for inclusion and, by doing so, inhibit direct comparisons between
them (Newman and Forcehimes 2010, 144). To create a uniform list of major events for study
the authors include dozens of possibly significant events in a model of presidential approval
ratings and report the events that had any statistically significant effect on presidential job
approval ratings. Newman and Forcehimes implore all future researchers to use the list of
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significant events discussed in their study because it provides for consistent comparison across
studies and because their selection of events is ostensibly unbiased.
Newman and Forcehimes (2010) do not consider congressional committee probes in their
list of events that can affect presidential approval ratings. Kriner and Schickler (2014), however,
find evidence indicating congressional committee probes have significant negative effects on
presidential approval ratings. Kriner and Schickler (2014) report Congress can and does use
investigative committees to negatively harm the president’s standing in the public. By doing so
Congress can check the president’s power even if they are unable to act legislatively to do so due
to veto threats by the president (Kriner and Schickler 2014, 521). Thus, future studies that
attempt to model every presidential event should consider including congressional committee
probes in their list of significant events.
Nearly all presidential approval rating research controlled for the national economy;
however, four third wave researchers, Geys and Vermeir (2007) and Fauvelle-Aymar and
Stemair (2013), specifically focused their research on how the national economy effects
presidential job approval ratings. Controlling for the strength of the national economy, wars,
scandals, rally-around-the-flag effects, and individual presidential terms, Geys and Vermeir
(2007), find that the level of the tax burden and changes in the tax structure affected presidential
approval ratings from 1959 through 2006. Interestingly, Geys and Vermeir find no statistically
significant evidence of inflation’s or unemployment’s having any effect on presidential approval
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ratings; however, budget deficits are found to have a statistically significant negative effect on
presidential approval ratings.15
Fauvelle-Aymar and Stemair (2013) find that changes in the speed of growth or decline
in the stock market can model presidential job approval ratings. When stock market growth is
decelerating presidential job approval ratings decrease; when growth is accelerating presidential
job approval ratings increase. When the stock market is declining, and if it is declining at
increasing rates the president is punished through lower job approval ratings. However, when the
market is declining at a decreasing rate, the president is rewarded with comparatively higher job
approval ratings. Burden and Mughan (2003) argue that the international economy is equally
important to presidential job approval ratings and the public as is the national economy. They
find that, during different periods during the last century, different aspects of the international
economy (such as trade deficits, and exchange rates) increased and decreased in issue saliency to
the American public. Because of the changes in issue saliency, these different aspects of the
international economy had varying impacts on presidential job approval ratings depending on
which aspect of the international economy was more politically salient to the public at the time.
The authors argue that these aspects of the international economy substantially affect presidential
job approval ratings when they become salient to the American public.
Interestingly, some presidential approval rating research has focused on the role emotions
and genetics play in presidential approval ratings. González-Bailón et al. (2012) examine

15

Similarly to Geys and Vermeir (2007), most research on presidential approval ratings measures
aggregate responses to objective economic indicators. For studies that use subjective
indicators of the economy, see: MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson (1992); Clarke and Stewart
(1994); Norpoth 1996; Bond and Fleisher (2001); and, Clarke et al. (2005).
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approval ratings from a social-psychological perspective. Specifically they use online
discussions to examine the emotions of the discussion posters following significant presidential
events. They study the discussions by coding them for varying levels of three emotional
dimensions: valence, arousal, and dominance. Then the authors model trends in valence, arousal,
and dominance to trends in political evaluations (specifically presidential approval ratings) over
a five year period (September 1999 to February 2005). Valence measures words that are
associated with feelings of happiness, satisfaction, and hope. The higher the score the more
happy or satisfied the subject is; however, lower scores represent sadness and despair (GonzálezBailón et al. 2012, 127). Arousal measures words that are associated with feelings of excitement,
anger, or frenzy. Dominance, as the name suggest, measures a subjects feelings of domination or
being in control versus feelings of submission or awe (González-Bailón et al. 2012, 127).
González-Bailón et al. (2012) report that high levels of anger might contribute to positive
evaluations of presidents at the beginning of wars (134). The angrier the public grows the better
evaluations become for presidents. The authors found valence and dominance feelings to be
statistically insignificant. Their findings are consistent with rally-around-the-flag-effect literature
and the finding the approval ratings start off high when wars start, but decline as wars draft on.
Perhaps the most important new research to come out on presidential approval ratings,
Miles (2015), demonstrates that roughly 62% of the variation in presidential approval ratings are
genetically heritable (773). Miles (2015) argues genes are “substantially more influential on
individual evaluations of presidential performance than [socialization]” (773). If Miles (2015)
results are theoretically valid than genetics plays a more important role in the development of
political attitudes and characteristics than socialization. In terms of presidential approval ratings,
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Miles (2015) finds the genetic makeup of individual’s influence how they perceive and interpret
presidential behavior in the short and long terms (773). Thus, genetic predispositions and
heritability can “explain why rally events, honeymoon periods, and the economy influence shortterm evaluations of presidential performance” (Miles 2015, 773).
The extant literature on presidents’ use of unilateral powers has grown substantially since
Moe and Howell (1999a, 1999b); however, additional analyses are needed to study the
relationship between presidential approval ratings and executive orders. The literature suggests
that many variables impact a president’s approval ratings. Most of these variables fall into one of
Mueller’s (1970, 1973) three categories: political variables, war-related variables, and event
dummy variables (Berlemann and Enkelmann 2014, 46). The next chapter of this thesis seeks to
use and expand upon past presidential approval research by modeling aggregate-level
presidential job approval ratings using political variables, war-related variables, and event
dummies, while also including variables to test the main theory and hypotheses of this thesis.
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CHAPTER 3: AGGREGATE-LEVEL MODELS
This chapter begins by examining the data and methodology used to create two
aggregate-level models, including how the data were obtained and how it was coded. After this I
discuss some of the problems inherent in time series data. Thus I present some of the bivariate
analysis results, followed by the results of ordinary least squares regression estimation of two
fixed effects models discussed in this chapter. I then end the chapter with a discussion of how the
results of this paper differ from prior research.

3.1

Data and Methodology

Two models are estimated at an aggregate level. 16 Both models employ monthly data,
beginning in January 1953; however, due to data limitations Model 1 includes data through 2012,
and Model 2 only includes data through 2002. Doing so yields 706 and 585 unique observations
respectively. The primary difference between the two models is that there is two variants of the
main variable of interest (Executive Orders). The executive orders variable can be subdivided
into two types: model 1 includes an executive orders variable that is a count of every executive
order issued in each month from 1953 to 2012; model 2 includes the same executive order
variable; however, it only include salient executive orders. Salient executive orders are defined
as those executive orders that are theoretically salient to the public, because they are featured by
news outlets and other forms of mass media. As previously discussed using data from Howell

16

Other models and variables were estimated; however, this paper only discusses the models and
variables that provided the best fit.
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(2005) 17, an executive order is considered a salient executive order when it is non-ceremonial
and featured on the front page of The New York Times.
The main dependent variable of all aggregate-level models (Average Approval) is the
average presidential job approval ratings for each month. To obtain this average, I use data
drawn from Gallup polls to measure presidential job approval ratings for each month. Then, I
average all approval ratings during the month to reach the mean presidential approval ratings in
each month. Presidential approval ratings for January, following presidential elections, are
indicative of the public’s view of the incoming president, because approval ratings for the
incumbent president were missing in most cases.18
The main independent variable of both aggregate-level models (Executive Orders) is a
variable measuring the total count of the month’s executive orders issued by the president.19 To
code this variable, I use data obtained from Howell (2005). There are two aggregate-level
models, and both models use different versions of the Executive Orders variable (see above).
Both variables are used to test Hypothesis 1 and 2.
Each aggregate-level model also contains the same vector of control variables. These
include control variables for: previous monthly presidential job approval ratings (Lagged
Approval); the stock market (Stock Market Index); the consumer price index (CPI); the
unemployment rate (Unemployment); divided government (Divided Government); the presence

Unfortunately this data only goes through 2002, and because of this Model 2 has fewer
observations (n=585).
18
Presidential job approval ratings that were missing following presidential elections are left
missing in the dataset; however, in all other cases linear interpolation was used to replace the
missing presidential job approval ratings data.
19
Lagging this variable and the other variables discussed below (Unemployment, CPI, and
SP_Comp) had no significant effect on the models.
17
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or absence of honeymoon periods (Honeymoon); scandals (Watergate and Iran Contra); the first
Iraq war, the second Iraq war, the Afghanistan war, and the 2007 surge in combat troops (Desert
Storm, Military Casualties (Iraq), Military Casualties (Afghanistan), Iraq_War, and Surge
respectively); the September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks (9/11); and dummy variables for each
president in the study (Eisenhower-Obama) to control for period effects during each of their
respective administrations.
A previous month’s average approval ratings are created by lagging the average
presidential approval variable by one month. 20 Because previous research has shown that a
president’s approval ratings are largely a function of previous approval ratings; including this
variable is a necessity in order to avoid autocorrelation and thus bias in the parameter estimates
(Fauvelle-Aymar and Stegmair 2013). CPI is the monthly Consumer Price Index all urban
consumers. Stock Market Index is the monthly Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 500 stock market
index21. Jones (2014) used unemployment data as an indicator of the nation’s economic wellbeing; however, this indicator variable failed to achieve statistical significance in any model.
Fauvelle-Aymar and Stegmair (2013) recommend that scholars employ a stock market index as
an indicator variable for the nation’s economic well-being because presidential job approval
ratings are highly associated with the economic well-being of the country. The paper uses both
variables. Doing so allows me to test the validity of Expected Finding 4.2. Unemployment is the

The first observation for each presidency is dropped from the study because a lag for their
previous presidential approval ratings does not exist within the dataset.
21
CPI and the S&P 500 stock market index were obtained from a dataset hosted by the economic
department of Yale University and created by Robert Shiller, Fumiko Kon-Ya and Yoshiro
Tsutsui. http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm (accessed October 13, 2015)
20
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monthly unemployment rate. Data for this variable were obtained from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics Current Population Survey. 22
Divided Government is a dichotomous variable that is coded one (1) when either chamber
of Congress’ majority party are not that of the president; it is coded zero (0) otherwise.
Theoretically, presidential approval ratings should be higher ceteris paribus during times of
divided government because it allows a president to credibly blame Congress for governmental
failures (Nicholson, Segura, and Woods 2002). This variable, and the accompanying divided
government variables, directly test Expected Finding 4.3. Honeymoon is a dichotomous variable
used to control for “honeymoon” periods (Expected Finding 4.4). Jones (2014) included this
variable and found it to have a statistically significant impact on presidential job approval
ratings. It is coded one (1) during the first six months of a newly-inaugurated president’s term,
and zero (0) otherwise.
The rest of the non-presidential dummy variables in the model are used to control for
wars, scandals, and rally-around-the-flag effects that may independently impact presidential
approval ratings (Geys and Vermeir 2008, 308; and Fauvelle-Aymar and Stegmair 2013,
414). Omitting these variables would likely cause omitted variable bias, and bias the estimates of
both models. It is likely that at the start of a war, presidential approval ratings will increase as
citizens react in a rally-around-the-flag effect (Geys and Vermeir 2008, 308), but as the war
continues, presidential approval ratings may decrease because of the increasing amount of battle
deaths associated with the war (Geys and Vermeir 2008, 308). Scandals are theorized to exert a
negative impact on presidential approval ratings. Both Watergate and the Iran-Contra Affair, for
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http://www.bls.gov/home.htm (accessed October 13, 2015)
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example, should have negative statistically significant effects on presidential approval ratings.
Rally-around-the-flag effects should exert positive changes in presidential approval in
subsequent months at least in the short-term. During times of national crises, rally-around-theflag effects should theoretically increase presidential approval ratings because a public mood of
national unity tends to permeate the country such that presidents will observe comparatively
higher presidential job approval ratings in the short-term (Geys and Vermeir 2008, 308).
There are four variables pertaining to war in this study: Operation Enduring Freedom
(Military Casualties (Afghanistan)), Operation Iraqi Freedom (Military Casualties (Iraq)),
Iraq_War (referring to Operation Iraqi Freedom), and Desert Storm. 23 Operations Enduring and
Iraqi Freedom are both monthly counts of military casualties pertaining to each war. Iraq_War is
a variable pertaining to the second Iraq war and Operation Iraqi Freedom, but instead of being a
count of military casualties, Iraq_War is a dichotomous variable coded (1) from March 2003
through September 2003 and (0) otherwise. 24 Desert Storm is a dummy variable pertaining to the
1990 invasion of Kuwait by Iraq and the subsequent U.S. military response (Operations Desert
Shield and Desert Storm). Similarly to Geys and Vermeir (2008), this variable is coded (1)
during each month from August 1990 to January 1991, and (0) otherwise25. It is theorized that
Military Casualties (Afghanistan) and Military Casualties (Iraq) will both have a negative effect

Due to data limitations (I was unable to gain access to credible statistics on Vietnam battle
deaths) no variable was included for the Vietnam War. Theoretically the presidential dummy
variables included in this study should account for the effects of the Vietnam War on
presidential job approval ratings.
24
Geys and Vermeir 2008 and Fauvelle-Aymar and Stemair (2013) include a similarly coded
variable; however, the dates used in this paper differ by a few months. Both papers begin their
second Iraq War variable in the first quarter of 2003 and end it in the second quarter.
25
This study uses monthly data, but Geys and Vermeir (2008) used quarterly data.
23
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on presidential job approval ratings, because of the length of both wars and the staggering
military casualties for the U.S.A. Desert Storm may have a positive effect on presidential job
approval ratings because of the short nature of the war and the much lower military casualties
(Geys and Vermeir, 2008). Geys and Vermeir (2008) and Fauvelle-Aymar and Stemair (2013)
consider Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm to be a rally-around-the-flag effect variable.
Similarly, I hypothesize the first few months of the second Iraq War (Iraq_War) will have a
positive effect on presidential approval ratings and behave similarly to a rally-around-the-flag
effect variable.
Two scandal control variables are included in this study: Watergate and Iran Contra.
Both variables borrow a similar coding scheme from Geys and Vermeir (2008). As its name
suggest, Watergate controls for the 1970s Watergate scandal that affected President Nixon. It is
coded (1) for all months from April 1973 to June 1974, and (0) otherwise. The Iran-Contra
Scandal affected President Reagan during the later months of 1986 and the early months of 1987.
To code this variable, all months between October 1986 and March 1987 are coded (1), and (0)
otherwise.
Besides Desert Storm, one other rally-around-the-flag-effect variable is included in this
study: the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack. Because of the dramatic increase in presidential
approval ratings following the attack and the remarkably slow decay in approval ratings after the
attack (Gaines 2002; Hetherington and Nelson 2003) I follow the advice of Geys and Vermeir
(2008) and code this variable as (0) in all months before the attack and as (1/t) beginning in
September for all months afterwards (where t = 1, 2, 3, …). Dividing (1) by (t) for all months
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after September 11, 2001 allows the variable to capture the effect of the slow decay in
presidential job approval ratings following the event.
The final vector of control variables in the proposed study is a series of dummy variables
that represent when each respective president was in office. There is one variable for each
president included in this study (Eisenhower to Obama). This vector thus specifies fixed effects
for the model allowing me to control for period effects during each presidents administration.
This will also allow me to test if executive orders had differing levels of issue saliency to the
public under each individual president. Each variable is coded one (1) during the respective
president’s presidency, and zero (0) otherwise.
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 1 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑙 = 𝑏̂1 (𝐴𝑙𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠) + 𝑏̂2 (𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑙)𝑡−1 +
𝑏̂3 (𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥) + 𝑏̂4 (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥) + 𝑏̂5 (𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒) +
𝑏̂6 (𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡) + 𝑏̂7 (𝐻𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑛 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑) + 𝑏̂8 (𝑊𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒) +
𝑏̂9 (𝐼𝑟𝑎𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎) + 𝑏̂10 (𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑡 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑚) + 𝑏̂11 (𝐼𝑟𝑎𝑞 𝑊𝑎𝑟) +
𝑏̂12 (𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝐼𝑟𝑎𝑞) + 𝑏̂13 (𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝐴𝑓𝑔ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛) +
𝑏̂14 (𝐼𝑟𝑎𝑞 "𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑔𝑒") + 𝑏̂15−25 (𝐸𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑛ℎ𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 − 𝑂𝑏𝑎𝑚𝑎)
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 2 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑙 = 𝑏̂1 (𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠) + 𝑏̂2 (𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑙)𝑡−1 +
𝑏̂3 (𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥) + 𝑏̂4 (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥) + 𝑏̂5 (𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒) +
𝑏̂6 (𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡) + 𝑏̂7 (𝐻𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑛 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑) + 𝑏̂8 (𝑊𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒) +
𝑏̂9 (𝐼𝑟𝑎𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎) + 𝑏̂10 (𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑡 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑚) + 𝑏̂11 (𝐼𝑟𝑎𝑞 𝑊𝑎𝑟) +
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𝑏̂12 (𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝐼𝑟𝑎𝑞) + 𝑏̂13 (𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝐴𝑓𝑔ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛) +
𝑏̂14 (𝐼𝑟𝑎𝑞 "𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑔𝑒") + 𝑏̂15−25 (𝐸𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑛ℎ𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 − 𝑂𝑏𝑎𝑚𝑎)

3.2

Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Analysis

Table 1 (see Appendix A) contains a number of descriptive statistics including the
monthly minimum, maximum, and mean of the following variables: presidential job approval
ratings (Presidential Approval); executive orders (E.O. and Salient E.O.); the S&P stock market
index (Stock Market Index); the Consumer Price Index all urban consumers (CPI); and
Unemployment.26 The stock market and consumer price indices are not particularly informational
on their own, because of the time series nature of the data used and monetary inflation; therefore,
I have also included descriptive statistics of the percentage change in both variables. Of
particular interest, the executive orders variable has a maximum of 19 executive orders issued in
a month, but the maximum number of salient executive orders in a month was only four;
however, both maxima only occur once in this dataset. Tables 2 and 3 (see Appendix A) contain
frequency distributions of both executive order variables. As can be seen from the tables the
modes for both executive order variables are three and zero respectively (occurring in 118 and
457 different months respectively).
Figure 1 (see Appendix A) is a graph that depicts the relationship between mean average
monthly approval ratings and all executive orders. Table 4 depicts the same relationship as
Figure 1, but using mean comparison analysis instead of a graph. The figures indicates either a

26

Unless noted otherwise, all data discussed in this section and the relevant tables and figures in
Appendix A use the original unmodified data that I collected before I fractionally differenced
and made each series stationary.
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very slight positive relationship or no relationship between the two at all. Conducting a Pearson’s
r correlation indicates a weak positive statistically significant correlation of .07 between all
executive orders and presidential job approval ratings. 27 These findings are contrary to my main
hypothesis; however, a correlation of .07 is too low to consider it as definitive evidence against
Hypothesis 1.
Conducting the same hypotheses test between presidential job approval ratings and
salient executive orders provides clearer evidence as to the validity of Hypothesis 1. Figure 2
depicts the relationship between mean average monthly approval ratings and salient executive
orders only. Table 5 is the accompanying mean comparison chart. Both indicate a strong positive
relationship between the two variables. As the number of salient executive orders issued in a
month increases, presidential job approval ratings increase; however, the strength of this
relationship is not as strong as the graph and mean comparison analysis seems to indicate. A
Pearson’s r correlation of the two variables indicates a rather weak relationship (r = .132)
between the two but it is a statistically significant correlation result. The correlation between
presidential job approval ratings and salient executive orders is much higher than the correlation
between presidential job approval ratings and all executive orders; however, it is also far too low
to provide any notable support for Hypothesis 1.
To test the remaining hypotheses using bivariate methods I estimated Pearson correlation
tests between presidential job approval ratings and the following variables: the previous month’s
presidential job approval ratings (i.e., presidential job approval ratings lagged by one month); the
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See Appendix A and Table 6 for Pearson’s r correlations of lagged approval ratings, all
executive orders, significant executive orders only, stock market index, and the consumer price
index on presidential job approval ratings.
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S&P stock market index (Stock Market Index); the consumer price index (CPI); divided
government; and honeymoon. 28 Not surprisingly, and consistent with the literature (Nicholson,
Segura, and Woods 2002; Burden and Mughan 2003; Geys and Vermeir 2008; Newman and
Forcehimes 2010; Fauvelle-Aymar and Stegmair 2013), the correlation between presidential job
approval ratings and lagged presidential job approval ratings is positive and highly statistically
significant with a correlation of .930. Surprisingly, the correlation between the S&P Stock
Market Index and presidential job approval ratings is negative and highly statistically significant
(r = -0.186). It was expected that the stock market index would be positive and statistically
significant. This is inconsistent with prior research (Fauvelle-Aymar and Stemair 2013) and
Expected Finding 4.2. The CPI and presidential approval ratings correlation is in the expected
direction (negative) and highly statistically significant with a correlation of -0.261. An increase
in the consumer price index should have a theoretically negative impact on presidential approval
ratings (Fauvelle-Aymar and Stemair 2013) and according to the correlation test it does.
Unfortunately, correlation tests between presidential job approval ratings and the divided
government variable did not find evidence to support Expected Finding 4.3. The correlation
between the two variables is statistically insignificant. Not surprisingly, and consistent with all
prior research and Expected Finding 4.4, the correlation between presidential job approval
ratings and the honeymoon period variable indicate a positive and statistically significant
relationship between the two, with r = 0.183. Correlation tests of presidential job approval
ratings and the dummy variables for the Watergate and Iran-Contra Scandals were also
conducted (see Table 7). Not surprisingly both variables possess negative correlations with
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See Table 6 for the correlation results.
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presidential job approval ratings; however, the correlation between the Iran-Contra scandal and
presidential job approval ratings is statistically insignificant.
While not particularly relevant to hypothesis testing I have also included a table
containing information on each respective president’s average job approval rating and the
average number of executive orders they issued monthly (see Table 8 in Appendix A).
Examining the data there seems to be no noticeable difference in the average amounts of
monthly executive orders issued by Republican and Democrat presidents; however, there is clear
trend of decreasing amounts of executive orders issued monthly as time passes. In fact, after
President Carter’s term in office the average amount of executive orders issued monthly
dramatically declines for all future presidents. The average amount of salient executive orders
issued monthly stays fairly consistent with slight declines after Presidents Kennedy and Reagan.

3.3

A Brief Word on OLS Regression and Time Series Analyses

Because this aggregate-level analysis of presidential job approval ratings uses monthly
data, it is necessary to discuss some of the potential problems associated with time series
analysis. The estimation technique used in this analysis is ordinary least squares regression
(OLS), but OLS regression requires several assumptions that need to be met that time series data
sometimes violate. The primary assumption that time series data are most likely to violate is the
assumptions of data stationarity. If data are not stationary, then spurious estimates may be
reported (Lanier 2003, 195). To solve the problem of non-stationary data researchers have relied
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on using first differences to make their data stationary (Lanier 2003, 195)29; however, this
technique may also lead to spurious regression if the data (series) is fractionally integrated
because taking the first difference “may serve to create patterns in the data that are not naturally
present” (Lanier 2003, 195). By fractionally differencing data, researchers can “more accurately
capture the data-generating process underlying their data” (Lanier 2003, 195).
To determine if my data are fractionally integrated (e.g., the data can by differenced by d
where 0<d<1 to make the data stationary) I use the Robinson’s Gaussian Semiparametric
Estimation Procedure to estimate d (Robinson 1995), where d is the number of differences
needed to make the series stationary and may be a non-integer (see above) (Lanier 2003, 19697). Table 9 in Appendix A shows the results of the Robinson’s Gaussian semiparametric
estimation procedure (RGSE procedure). The RGSE procedure test two null hypotheses. The
first is that d = 0, and the second is that d = 1. All series reject the null hypothesis that d = 1;
however, the following series fail to reject the null hypothesis that d = 0: The Surge; Watergate;
Divided Government; Eisenhower; Kennedy; Johnson; Nixon; Ford; Carter; Reagan; Bush;
Clinton; George W. Bush; and Obama. Failing to reject the null hypothesis that d = 0 indicates
that fractional differencing is not necessary for these variables. 30 The variables that do reject
both null hypotheses need to be fractionally differenced by d, because they are fractionally
integrated. Because they are fractionally integrated, I must difference the series by d, because, as

Geys and Vermeir (2008), and Fauvelle-Aymar and Stemair (2013) use first differences for
their series.
30
Because fractional differencing is not necessary, if a series is determined to be non-stationary
first differencing may be used to make the series stationary.
29
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mentioned above, differencing the series by an integer “may serve to create patterns in the data
that are not naturally present” and result in spurious estimates (Lanier 2003, 195).
The traditional test for stationarity is the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test; however,
this method has limited power in the presence of fractional alternatives. When data are
fractionally integrated it is more precise to use the Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and Shinn
(KPSS) test, because it is more robust to fractionally integrated data (Lanier 2003, 196-97). 31
Conducting ADF test on the data indicates that the series are stationary; however, the Robinson’s
Gaussian semiparametric estimation indicates that it is inappropriate to use ADF tests because all
of the series are fractionally integrated. KPSS test on each series of data indicate that each series
is non-stationary. After fractionally differencing the series that reject the null hypotheses of the
RGSE procedure by d, and then conducting KPSS tests I find that all of the series of data are
now stationary (See Table 10). 32
OLS regression also assumes homoscedasticity (the error term is the same across all
values of the independent variable). If the assumption of homoscedasticity is violated the
robustness of the model comes into questions. Homoscedasticity can inflate the significance of
some variables in that the standard error of the coefficient parameters are biased downwardly,
and deflate the significance of other variables. To combat homoscedasticity robust standard
errors were used when estimating each model. By controlling for stationarity, fractional

See Geys and Vermeir (2008), and Fauvelle-Aymar and Stemair (2013) for studies that only
use ADF test.
32
All dichotomous (dummy) variables were made stationary by taking the first difference of the
series.
31
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integration, and homoscedasticity I have created more robust models than using OLS regression
alone permits.

3.4

Regression Results

The results of both models can be found in Table 11 in Appendix A33. Despite previous
findings indicating a slight (albeit positive, and not negative) relationship between presidential
approval ratings and both executive orders variables, the hypothesis fails to find support in both
models. At an aggregate-level, presidential approval ratings are not affected by the number of
executive orders (salient or not) issued in a given month. Both models fail to find support for
Expected Finding 4.1. Previous monthly presidential approval ratings do not have a statistically
significant effect on the current month’s presidential approval ratings ceteris paribus.34 This is
despite an overwhelming amount of prior research indicating it should (Nicholson, Segura, and

Coefficients are unstandardized. The constant was excluded from the model to allow for
presidential dummy variables for each president. This decision was made after testing revealed
which presidential dummy variable to exclude (if I kept the constant) had non-arbitrary effects
on which variables were statistically significant.
34
This suggest the lagged endogenous variable (lagged presidential approval ratings) may not be
necessary to include in the models. It was included in this study due to the overwhelming
amount of prior research that suggested it had significant impacts on presidential job approval
ratings (Nicholson, Segura, and Woods 2002; Burden and Mughan 2003; Geys and Vermeir
2008; Newman and Forcehimes 2010; Fauvelle-Aymar and Stegmair 2013), and because it
controls for serial-autocorrelation. Because lagged presidential approval ratings was not
statistically significant, I estimated a new model without the variable. When the lagged
endogenous variables was not included in the estimation, military casualties in Afghanistan
was found to be statistically insignificant. Besides military casualties in Afghanistan becoming
statistically insignificant, no other significant changes occurred between models. It should be
noted, however, that the model without lagged approval ratings suffers from slight positive
autocorrelation. A Durbin-Watson test statistic of 1.77 was estimated for the model. DurbinWatson test statistics range in value from 0-4. A value of two (2) indicates no autocorrelation,
a value of zero (0) indicates extreme positive autocorrelation, and a value of four (4) indicates
extreme negative autocorrelation.
33
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Woods 2002; Burden and Mughan 2003; Geys and Vermeir 2008; Newman and Forcehimes
2010; Fauvelle-Aymar and Stegmair 2013).
Not surprisingly, in both models CPI is negative and statistically significant, and Stock
Market Index is positive and statistically significant. Both variables function as indicators of the
national economy, and coefficients for each variable have the expected sign (negative for CPI,
and positive for Stock Market Index). These findings are consistent with prior research
(Nicholson, Segura, and Woods 2002; Burden and Mughan 2003; Geys and Vermeir 2008;
Newman and Forcehimes 2010; Fauvelle-Aymar and Stegmair 2013). Consistent with my own
prior research (Jones 2014) and other prior research (Nicholson, Segura, and Woods 2002; Geys
and Vermeir 2008; Fauvelle-Aymar and Stegmair 2013), the unemployment variable is
statistically insignificant in both models.
The divided government variable included in both models is positive and statistically
significant in both models. The results of both models lend support to the notion (Expected
Finding 4.3) that presidents are more able to pass blame credibly to other political actors during
times of divided government than they are during times of unified government (Nicholson,
Segura, and Woods 2002). Jones (2014), however, found divided government to have no
statistically significant effect on presidential approval ratings. Surprisingly, the Honeymoon
variable is statistically insignificant in both models, despite prior research finding it to be
statistically significant (Nicholson, Segura, and Woods 2002; Geys and Vermeir 2008; FauvelleAymar and Stegmair 2013).
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The variables pertaining to the Watergate and Iran-Contra scandals fail to achieve
statistical significance. The War variables do not fare much better.35 The variable measuring
military casualties in the Afghanistan war is negative and statistically significant; however, the
sign of the variable measuring military casualties in the second Iraq war is in the theoretically
unexpected direction (positive) and statistically insignificant. Both dichotomous war variables
(Desert Storm and Iraq War) possess the theoretically expected sign, but they fail to achieve
statistical significance. This is not too surprising given that Fauvelle-Aymar and Stegmair (2013)
also fail to find statistical significance for the Gulf War variables; however, it should be noted
that Fauvelle-Aymar and Stegmair (2013) and I based both Gulf War variables from the coding
used in Geys and Vermeir (2008) and latter set of authors did find statistical significance for both
variables. 36

As previously discussed, the presidential fixed-effects variables estimated in both models
should theoretically control for the effects of the Vietnam War on presidential approval ratings.
To test this theory I created a control variable for the Vietnam War. The variable is coded (-1)
during the Johnson administration, (1) during the Nixon administration, and (0) during all other
administrations. This coding scheme is borrowed directly from Norpoth (1984) and FauvelleAymar and Stegmair (2013). Norpoth suggest the Vietnam War had a negative impact on
Johnson’s approval ratings, and a positive impact on Nixon’s approval ratings. Because this
new variable was found to be non-stationary, but not fractionally integrated, I took the first
difference of the variable to make it stationary. The Vietnam War variable was not statistically
significant when included in both models, and it had no significant impact on the models. This
suggest that either the variable’s coding scheme is not theoretically valid, or that the fixedeffects dummy variables are capturing the impacts of the Vietnam War on presidential
approval ratings. Perhaps using U.S. military casualties during the Vietnam War would have
statistically significant impacts on both models; however, I was unable to obtain reliable data
on U.S. military casualties during the Vietnam War.
36
I did, however, change the months coded (1) and the months coded (0) from the original
coding of Geys and Vermeir (2008) for my second Gulf War variable (Iraq_War), and both
papers (Geys and Vermeir 2008; and Fauvelle-Aymar and Stegmair 2013) used quarterly data
instead of monthly data. Their doing so may promote more volatility in the variables, which
could lead to statistically significant findings.
35
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Most of the fixed-effects presidential dummy variables achieve statistical significance;
however, some of their coefficient estimates are unexpectedly large (Eisenhower and Kennedy).
This could be indicative of a problem with the model, or it could indicate that large period effects
affected presidential approval ratings during Eisenhower and Kennedy’s respective presidencies.
The dummy variables for Eisenhower and Kennedy are both negative and have fairly large
coefficients (-76 and -70 respectively). Pearson’s r correlations on all presidential dummy
variables reveal none have any correlation with each other except the Eisenhower and Kennedy
variables with a correlation of 0.7. This correlation is high, and as variance inflation factors
indicate, is causing multicollinearity to exist between the two variables.
The decision to include two variables that are collinear was not made lightly. Testing of
four different models revealed Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Schwarz Bayesian
Criterion (SBC) scores were lower for the model that included both the Eisenhower and Kennedy
fixed-effects variables. Lower criterion scores indicate a better fitting model. Because, the
models that excluded one or more of the Eisenhower, and Kennedy fixed-effects variables
performed worse (i.e., higher criterion scores), choosing to use the model that included all
presidential fixed-effects variables is the right decision. Multicollinearity increases the standard
error of the estimated coefficients, and makes them unstable in several ways; however,
multicollinearity is “only a problem for the variables that are collinear…. but so long as the
collinear variables are only used as control variables and they are not collinear with your
variables of interest, [multicollinearity is not a] problem” (Allison 2012). I have chosen to keep
both variables in the final specification because they provide the best fit, the most explanatory
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power, and have no adverse effect on the primary variables of interest to this study (executive
orders).

3.5

Conclusion

The results presented here differ from those of previous research in several significant
ways. Probably the most significant way is that in both models, the lagged dependent variable
(presidential job approval ratings) was not statistical significant despite prior research suggesting
that it should be (Nicholson, Segura, and Woods 2002; Burden and Mughan 2003; Geys and
Vermeir 2008; Newman and Forcehimes 2010; Fauvelle-Aymar and Stegmair 2013). There are a
number of reasons this could be the case. It is difficult to compare previous research on the
subject because models and methodology used between researchers can differ; researchers often
use varying time periods; and many studies use different units of analysis (monthly or quarterly
data). Some of the papers discussed (Burden and Mughan 2003; and Geys and Vermeir 2008)
fail to use robust standard errors to combat the possible heteroscedasticity of their estimates.
Nicholson, Segura, and Woods (2002) and Fauvelle-Aymar and Stegmair (2013) use robust
standard errors to combat possible heteroscedasticity; however, both papers fail to address the
problem of fractional integration. Nicholson, Segura, and Woods (2002) do not account for the
stationarity of their data or fractional integration. Fauvelle-Aymar and Stegmair (2013) do
consider the stationarity of their data; however, by only testing the stationarity of their data using
Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests, and not testing for the presence of fractionally integrated data
their findings might be the result of spurious regression (Lanier 2003, 195). Newman and
Forechimes (2010) use error correction models so they may be controlling for heteroscedasticity;
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however, they only account for fractional integration in their dependent variable, and not in
every series. This is a fundamental violation of the assumption of model equivalency that
underlies time series analyses. The use of potentially non-stationary, and fractionally integrated
data, as well as failing to control for heteroscedasticity, could explain why prior research found
lagged approval ratings to be statistically significant while this analysis does not. When I
estimate both models without using Huber-White robust standard errors, many of the variables
that are statistically insignificant in my models become statistically significant (including lagged
approval).
This analysis uses econometric modeling techniques to create the aggregate-level models.
Other alternative modeling options exist that may be considered when modeling presidential job
approval ratings. The primary alternative is to use Autoregressive Fractionally Integrated
Moving Average (ARFIMA) models to model presidential approval ratings. 37 This methodology
has some strengths and weaknesses compared to the methodology used to create the aggregatelevel models in this paper. No matter what methodology is used, it is important for future
researchers to consider not only the stationarity of their data, but also the possibility that their
data are fractionally integrated. Given the findings reported in Table 9 and the Robinson’s
procedure used in this analysis, it seems likely that all aggregate-level Presidential job approval
rating data are fractionally integrated, because aggregate-level presidential job approval data are
created by aggregating individual-level data which results in fractional dynamics in the time
series, because the aggregate series is produced by combining individual-level series that have
their own autoregressive and/or moving average components that describe the individuals’
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See Newman and Forchimes (2010) for an example of AFIMA models.
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behavior being combined (Granger 1980; Lanier 2003, 193-194). Future researchers should also
consider using different modeling techniques more suited to handling events that can cause
exogenous shocks on presidential approval ratings. Some studies have attempted to model every
possible event that can have an exogenous shock on presidential job approval ratings (see
Newman and Forcehimes 2010). While this analysis does control for some of those events, it
does not control for every possible event that could affect presidential approval ratings.
Given the rather low explanatory power of both models (the adjusted R was .27 and .23
for model 1 and 2 respectively), it seems many potential explanatory factors were omitted from
the model.38 Some of these may have been events that I missed (as noted above). Other potential
predictors of presidential approval ratings that were left out include various international
economy variables. As Burden and Mughan (2003) demonstrate, U.S. citizens are keenly aware
of the international economy, and, therefore, presidential approval ratings are affected by the
state of the international economy as it relates to the U.S. economy.
Future aggregate-level studies should split presidential approval ratings by partisan
identity. Gallup has data on aggregate-level presidential approval ratings by partisan identity;
however, I was unable to access this data. Future studies benefit greatly from there data if they
use it, because it seems likely that factors that affect presidential approval ratings may not effect
it evenly for all partisan identities (Bond and Fleisher 2001). Perhaps executive orders do have a
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Due to the large size of the 9/11 coefficient estimate, some may theorize the adjusted RSquared of .27, for model 1, and .23, for model 2, may be overwhelmingly due to the inclusion
of the 9/11 terrorist attack rally-around-the-flag variable. Estimating an OLS regression of only
the 9/11 variable on presidential approval ratings yielded an adjusted R-Squared values of .02.
This suggest that the 9/11 variable on its own, only explains 2% of the variation in presidential
job approval ratings.
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statistically significant effect on presidential approval ratings when you disaggregate presidential
approval ratings by partisan identity. To test this theory, and to prevent the ecological fallacy of
applying aggregate-level findings on individuals, I examine two individual-level models of
presidential approval ratings in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 4: INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL MODELS
The previous chapter has tentatively demonstrated that at aggregate-level, the number of
executive orders issued by presidents in a given month does not affect presidential approval
ratings. To examine how the number of executive orders a president issues affects presidential
approval ratings at an individual-level, a pooled cross section arrangement of data from 1980 to
2012 are constructed to specify two logistic regression models. The next section of this chapter
examines the data and methodology used to create the two logistic regression models, including
how the data were obtained and how it was coded. In section 4.2 I present some of the bivariate
analysis results, followed by the results of binary logistic regression estimation of the two
models discussed in this chapter. I then conclude by discussing how the results of this project
differ from those of prior research.

4.1

Data and Methodology

Two models are estimated at the individual-level of analysis. Both models employ time
series survey data obtained from The American National Election Studies (ANES). 39 The ANES
time series surveys gathered data for the years 1980 through 2012.40 The ANES has survey data
as early as 1948; however, 1980 is the first year in which questions about the national economy
were asked in the survey. Model 1 uses data from 1980 through 2012, which yields 31,526

http://electionstudies.org/studypages/anes_timeseries_cdf/anes_timeseries_cdf.htm (accessed
May 1, 2015)
40
The ANES time series surveys that gathered these data from 1980 through 2012 were
administered every two years from 1980 to 2004 (i.e., the survey years are 1980, 1982, 1984,
etc.) In 2006 and 2010 the ANES did not conduct time series surveys.
39
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unique observations.41 Similarly to the previous chapter, Model 2 uses data only through 2002,
because Model 2’s main independent variable of interest is only salient executive orders.42 This
yields 20,570 unique observations. By using salient and non-salient executive orders as defined
by Howell (2005) this analysis (and the previous aggregate-level analysis) can control for issue
salience. Issues vary over time in their salience to the public and in their impact on presidential
approval ratings (Edwards III, Mitchel, Welch 1995, 108). Issues that are more salient to
respondents have larger effects on presidential approval ratings than issues with less salience.
The main dependent variable of all individual-level models (Presidential Approval) is the
answer to a yes-or-no question asking respondents “Do you approve or disapprove of the way
that [the president] is handling his job as President?” Because the answer to this question is
dichotomous, binary logistic regression is used in this analysis to estimate both models; because
the use of OLS regression for such dependent variables would likely lead to biased coefficient
estimates (Pollock III 2012, 237). Both models are primarily differentiated by the use of two
different executive orders variables (all executive orders, or salient executive orders only) as the
primary independent variable of theoretical interest. Executive Orders is the count of all
executive orders issued from August of the previous year through August of the year of the
survey. Each ANES survey began data collection in September, so Executive Orders is the count
of all executive orders issued over the 13-month period prior to the survey’s being

I have chosen to pool the data obtained from each year, instead of creating separate datasets
and models for each year. See section 4.5 of this chapter for a discussion of the disadvantages
of this method.
42
See section 3.2 for a definition of “salient executive orders”.
41
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administered.4344 Similarly, Salient Executive Orders is a count of all salient executive orders
issued from August of the previous year through August of the year of the survey.
With one exception (discussed below), both models incorporate the same vector of
control variables. These include variables controlling for a respondent’s party identification
(Party ID)45; age (Age); education (Education); gender (Gender); social class (Social Class)46;
race (Caucasian, African American, and Hispanic)47; internal efficacy (Internal Efficacy);
external efficacy (External Efficacy); perception of the economy in the past (Perception of the
Economy (Past)); and outlook of how the economy will perform in the future (Perception of the
Economy (Future)). Model 1 includes a control variable for divided government (Divided
Government) that is not included in Model 2 due to multicollinearity issues.48 Both models also
contain a control variable for each president’s partisan identity (President’s Party ID), and
several carefully chosen interaction effect variables (discussed below).
Party ID is an ordinal level variable that measures the strength of a respondent’s partisan
identity when compared to the current president at the time of the survey. This variable has the
following seven categories: (1) “strong opposite”; (2) “mild opposite”; (3) “weak opposite”; (4)
“neutral” (or independent); (5) “weak same”; (6) “mild same”; and (7) “strong same.” The

This variable (Executive Orders) is mean-centered in Model 1 (discussed below).
There are a number of drawbacks to coding both executive order variables this way. See the
conclusion section of this chapter (section 4.5) for a discussion on these drawbacks.
45
This variable is mean-centered in Model 1 (discussed below).
46
Substituting Social Class with household income had no significant impacts on any model.
47
Estimating the logistic regression models by excluding the Caucasian, and Hispanic
dichotomous variables and only specifying the African-American dichotomous variable had no
significant impacts on any model.
48
Multicollinearity was determined by examining variance inflation factor (VIF) statistics. The
VIF for Divided Government was over 15 in Model 2 – suggesting extreme multicollinearity
with President’s Party ID (discussed below).
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ANES asks respondents to place themselves on the following seven-point ideological scale:
strong Democrat, weak Democrat, independent-leaning Democrat, Independent, independentleaning Republican, weak Republican, or strong Republican. To construct the Party ID variable,
I subtracted four from the ANES seven-point ideological scale described above, and multiplied
this variable by -1 during survey years in which the president is a Democrat, and by positive one
when the president was a Republican. If Expected Finding 5.1 is theoretically valid I expect to
find evidence indicating that as Party ID increases the likelihood of an individual approving of
the way the president is handling his job as president increases, ceteris paribus.
Model 1 also contains an interaction effect variable created by multiplying Executive
Orders and Party ID. I included this interaction effect variable because, theoretically, executive
orders may have different effects on respondents’ approval of the president when they are more
closely aligned with the president’s partisan identity (as measured by Party ID), than when they
are more distant from the President’s partisan identity.49 By estimating this interaction effect,
multicollinearity was introduced into Model 1. It is important to remove the multicollinearity
from the specified equation, because multicollinearity may bias the estimates; therefore, I
removed the multicollinearity in the model by mean-centering Executive Orders and Party
ID.5051 Then, I recreated the interaction effect variable from the newly-centered variables and

This variable is not available in Model 2, because an interaction of Salient Executive Orders
and Party ID was found to be statistically insignificant when estimating Model 2 and including
the interaction effect variable in the model did not increase its level of statistical significance.
50
Mean centering is the act of subtracting the mean from the variable. Mean centering (or
standardizing) a variable is a common technique to avoid multicollinearity between interaction
effect variables, and the variables that are used to create the interaction effect variable (Aiken
and West 1991).
51
It should be noted that Party ID is a discreet variable and an unpublished pdf document from
Williams (2015) cautions readers to only mean center continuous variables.
49
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specified only the mean-centered variables in Model 1. Doing so allows me to keep all three
variables without adversely affecting the model estimation (Aiken and West 1991).
Age is a standard interval-level control variable that measures a respondent’s age.52
Education is an ordinal-level control variable that measures the highest level of education that a
respondent has obtained, with the following four categories: (1) grade school or less; (2) high
school; (3) some college (but no degree); and (4) college or advanced degree. Gender is a
standard control variable; however, it is also used to test the validity of Expected Finding 5.4. It
is a dichotomous variable coded such that female respondents are coded one (1), and male
respondents are coded zero (0). Social Class is an eight category ordinal-level variable that
controls for a respondent’s wealth by controlling for their social class. The categories are as
follows: (0) lower class; (1) average working; (2) working; (3) upper working; (4) average
middle; (5) middle class; (6) upper middle; and (7) upper class.
A respondent’s race is specified in the models by the following three dichotomous race
variables: Caucasian, African American, and Hispanic. As the variable names suggest, each race
variable is coded one (1) if the respondent belongs to that race (Caucasian, African American, or
Hispanic), and zero (0) otherwise.53 Internal Efficacy measures a respondent’s internal level of
political efficacy. The ANES ask respondents if they agree with or disagree with the following
question: “sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can’t
really understand what’s going on.” Internal Efficacy is coded one (1) when a respondent
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Age intervals range include 1-99, and 100 or over.
These race dummy variables were chosen because Caucasian, African American, and Hispanic
respondents were the most commonly identified races of respondents in the survey (99% of the
surveyed respondents identified themselves as Caucasian, African American, or Hispanic).
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disagrees with the question, and zero (0) when the respondent agrees with the question. External
Efficacy controls for a respondent’s external level of efficacy. The ANES also ask respondents:
“how much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is
right?” The ANES then coded responses to this question following this metric: (1) none of the
time/never; (2) some of the time; (3) most of the time; (4) just about always; and (9) don’t know
or depends. To code external efficacy (External Efficacy) I recoded the original measure that the
ANES employed into a four-category, ordinal-level variable with respondents who answered do
not know or depends recoded as missing; thus, higher categories in the variable denote higher
levels of absolute trust in the government to do what is right.
Perception of the Economy (Past) is a control variable used to control for a respondent’s
perception of how the economy has performed in the past and to test the validity of Expected
Finding 5.2. The ANES ask respondents to answer the following question: “Would you say that
over the past year the nation’s economy has gotten better, stayed the same or gotten worse?”
Respondent responses are then coded as missing, better, stayed same, or worse. To code
Perception of the Economy (Past) I recoded the variable discussed above into a three-category,
ordinal-level variable such that worse was coded negative one (-1), stayed the same was coded
zero (0), and better was coded one (1). This variable controls for both the national economy, and
respondents’ knowledge about how the economy is performing. Perception of the Economy
(Future) is very similar to Perception of the Economy (Past); however, as the variable name
suggests, Perception of the Economy (Future) asks respondents about how they believe the
economy will perform in the next year. It is coded negative one (-1) when respondent’s believe
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the economy will perform worse, zero (0) when they believe the economy will stay about the
same, and one (1) when they believe the economy will perform better.
Model 1 also includes a variable (Divided Government) to control for periods of divided
government. Divided Government is a dichotomous variable that is coded one (1) during survey
years in which either chamber of Congress’ majority party are not that of the president; it is
coded zero (0) otherwise. As mentioned above, and described in further detail below, this
variable is not specified in Model 2 because it had to be excluded to avoid multicollinearity.
Both models also contain a variable (President’s Party ID) to control for the current president’s
(at the time of the survey administration) party affiliation. President’s Party ID is coded one (1)
when the president belongs the Republican Party; and zero (0) otherwise.54 Both models also
contain a Gender and President’s Party ID interaction effect variable that is used to test the
validity of Expected Finding 5.4. To create this variable I simply multiplied Gender by
President’s Party ID.
Model 1
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑙 = 𝑎̂ + 𝑏̂1 (𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠) + 𝑏̂2 (𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝐼𝐷) +
𝑏̂3 (𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠 ∗ 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝐼𝐷) + 𝑏̂4 (𝐴𝑔𝑒) + 𝑏̂5 (𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) + 𝑏̂6 (𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟) +
𝑏̂7 (𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠) + 𝑏̂8 (𝐶𝑎𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑎𝑛) + 𝑏̂9 (𝐴𝑓𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛 𝐴𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛) + 𝑏̂10 (𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑐) +
𝑏̂11 (𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑐𝑦) + 𝑏̂12 (𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑐𝑦) +
𝑏̂13 (𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡) + 𝑏̂14 (𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦 𝐹𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒) +
𝑏̂15 (𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 ′ 𝑠 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝐼𝐷) + 𝑏̂16 (𝐷𝑖𝑣_𝐺𝑜𝑣) + 𝑏̂17 (𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠_𝑃𝐼𝐷) + 𝑒
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I coded the dummy variable such that Republican presidents were coded 1, because
Republican presidents were in office during 55% of the surveyed years.
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Model 2
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑙 = 𝑎̂ + 𝑏̂1 (𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠) + 𝑏̂2 (𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝐼𝐷) + 𝑏̂3 (𝐴𝑔𝑒) +
𝑏̂4 (𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) + 𝑏̂5 (𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟) + 𝑏̂6 (𝑆𝐸𝑆) + 𝑏̂7 (𝐶𝑎𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑎𝑛) + 𝑏̂8 (𝐴𝑓𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛 𝐴𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛) +
𝑏̂9 (𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑐) + 𝑏̂10 (𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑐𝑦) + 𝑏̂11 (𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑐𝑦) +
𝑏̂12 (𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡) + 𝑏̂13 (𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦 𝐹𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒) +
𝑏̂14 (𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 ′ 𝑠 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝐼𝐷) + 𝑏̂15 (𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠_𝑃𝐼𝐷) + 𝑒

4.2

Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Analysis

Table 12 (see Appendix B) contains a number of descriptive statistics for the following
variables: Presidential Approval; Executive Orders; Salient Executive Orders; Party ID; Age;
Education; Gender; SES; all three race variables; Internal Efficacy; External Efficacy;
Perception of the Economy (Past); Perception of the Economy (Future); President’s Party ID;
and Divided Government. The mean of Presidential Approval is .55 suggesting that 55 percent of
respondents approved of the way the president (at the time) handled their job. The minimum
number of executive orders issued in this study (Carter-Obama) was thirty-one by President
George W. Bush. The highest number of executive orders issued in this study was 82 by
President Reagan. Executive orders that were reported on by the N.Y. Times, and, thus,
considered salient executive orders, were issued less often, having a minimum of zero and a
maximum of five salient executive orders issued in a given thirteen month period.
Table 13 provides descriptive statistics on the number of respondents in each survey year,
the number of all executive orders and salient executive orders issued in the 13 month period
prior to the start of each survey, and the type of government (unified or divided) at the time of
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each survey. As can be seen from the tables, 714 executive orders were issued in total, but only
26 salient executive orders were issued, and divided government was present in twelve out of the
fifteen years that the surveys covered.
Table 14 (see Appendix B) depicts the relationship between mean Presidential Approval
and Executive Orders. The table seems to indicate no relationship at all between Presidential
Approval and Executive Orders, and does not support Hypothesis 1. Conducting a Pearson’s r
correlation indicates no statistically significant relationship exist between the two variables with
a correlation of 0.00.55
Table 15 provides slightly clearer evidence as to the validity of Hypothesis 2; however, it
fails to find any notable support for the hypothesis. Table 15 depicts the relationship between
mean Presidential Approval and Salient Executive Orders with a mean-comparison analysis.
Table 15 seemingly indicate a weak negative relationship between the amount of salient
executive orders issued and approval of the president.
As expected Expected Finding 5.1 finds statistical support from the results listed in Table
16. Table 16 reports the results from a mean-comparison analysis between Presidential Approval
and Party ID. Each one unit change in Party ID corresponds to higher mean Presidential
Approval. This shows a strong positive relationship between the two variables, which is
consistent with the findings of Bond and Fleisher (2001) and Lebo and Cassino (2007). Tables
17 and 18 provided credible support for Expected Finding 5.2, consistent with the findings of
Bond and Fleisher (2001) and Clarke et al. (2005). Table 17 is a mean-comparison analysis
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This finding is not statistically significant, because the two-tailed significance was 0.935. See
Appendix B and Table 21 for all Pearson’s r correlations of variables relevant to the five
individual-level hypotheses.
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between Perception of the Economy (Past) and Presidential Approval, and a mean-comparison
analysis between Perception of the Economy (Future) and Presidential Approval. In both tables,
one unit changes in Perception of the Economy (Past) and Perception of the Economy (Future)
are associated with higher mean approval ratings for the president. A mean-comparison analysis
of divided government and presidential approval ratings (Table 18 in Appendix B) finds some
credible support for Expected Finding 5.3. The mean of Presidential Approval is higher during
times of divided government than it is during times of unified government. Expected Finding 5.4
finds some support consistent with the theoretical expectations of Expected Finding 5.4. Gender
and Presidential Approval, while controlling for a president’s party affiliation (see Table 19 in
Appendix B), yielded results indicating a statistically significant difference of .05 in mean
approval ratings between genders.

4.3

Logistic Regression Results

The results of both models can be found in Table 20 located in Appendix B.56 Executive
Orders is statistically insignificant in Model 1; however, the interaction effect variable for
Executive Orders and Party ID is statistically significant. Table 21 reports the predicted
probability of a respondent approving of the president when all variables are held at their mean,
median, or modal values (where appropriate)57 – excluding Executive Orders and Party ID which

Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) scores are included in Table 20 to test for multicollinearity. All
scores are less than 10 (and most less than 5) suggesting that multicollinearity is not present in
either model after mean-centering Executive Orders, Party ID, and their interaction effect
variable in Model 1 (Kennedy 1985; and Hair et al. 1995).
57
Variables are held at their mean when they are measured at an interval-level, their median
when they are measured at an ordinal-level, and their modal value when they are measured at a
nominal-level.
56
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are allowed to vary. Table 21 provides partial evidence as to the validity of Hypothesis 1. As the
number of executive orders issued increases, the predicted probability of a respondent approving
of the president decreases for respondents that identify as being strongly aligned with the
president’s partisan identity (Party ID=7); however, as the number of executive orders issued
increases the predicted probability of respondents identifying as being strongly opposite of the
president’s partisan identity (Party ID=1), increases. This is inconsistent with my theory and
Hypothesis 3.58 Table 21 reports these results despite the fact that Executive Orders is not
statistically significant, because its interaction with Party ID is statistically significant and
because the interaction effect variable has a negative coefficient estimate. Not surprisingly,
Tables 20 and 21 provide evidence as to the validity of Expected Finding 5.1 for both models.
Party ID is statistically significant and its coefficient estimate is positively consistent with my
theoretical expectations. The predicted probability of a respondent’s approving of the president is
much higher when a respondent is classified as “strong same” for every level or number of
executive orders issued than it is at all other values of Party ID, as evidenced by Tables 21 and
22.
Similar to Table 21, Table 22 notes the predicted probability of a respondent approving
of the president when all variables are held at their mean, median, or modal values (where
appropriate), excluding Salient Executive Orders and Party ID which are allowed to vary. Salient
executive orders is statistically significant and has a negative parameter estimates. This suggest,
and as Table 22 demonstrates, that as the number of salient executive orders issued increases, the
probability of a respondent’s approving of the president decreases, ceteris paribus, consistent
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The implications of this finding are discussed in the conclusion section of this chapter.
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with Hypothesis 3. Consistent with Expected Finding 5.2, and the reported findings of Bond and
Fleisher (2001) and Clarke et al. (2005), Perception of the Economy (Past) and Perception of the
Economy (Future) are statistically significant and their coefficients are in the expected direction
(positive) for both models. Respondents who believe the economy is now performing better than
it actually was over the last year are significantly more likely to approve of the president than are
respondents who believe the economy has been performing worse that it was over the last year.
Similarly, respondents who believe the economy will perform better in the next twelve months
(Perception of the Economy (Future)) are more likely to approve of the president, than are those
respondents who believe the economy will perform worse in the next twelve months.
Consistent with Expected Finding 5.3 and the findings of Nicholson, Segura, and Woods
(2002), Divided Government is positive and statistically significant in Model 1. During times of
divided government, respondents are more likely to approve of the president than they are during
times of unified government. Contrary to the results of Clarke et al. (2005), and other literature
reporting a gender gap, I do not find support for Expected Finding 5.4 in either model. Table 23
reports the predicted probabilities of approving of the president when all other variables –
excluding Gender and President’s Party ID – are held at their mean, or median (where
appropriate). Table 23 reports the probability of a respondent’s approving of a Republican
president is roughly the same for both genders, and females are equally likely to approve of
Democratic presidents or Republic presidents. The predicted probability of a female respondent’s
approving of a Democratic president is slightly higher than the predicted probability of a male
respondent approving of a Democratic president; however, this slight difference is not consistent
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with Expected Finding 5.4, because Table 23 reports both genders are more likely to approve of
Republican presidents than Democratic presidents.
Interestingly, age and education have negative signed coefficient estimates in both
models. This suggest that the probability of a respondent’s approving of the president decreases
as age increases. Similarly, the probability of a respondents’ approving of the president
decreases as education increases. Social Class and all three race control variables are statistically
insignificant in both models. Suggesting that the likelihood of a respondent approving of the
president is not affected by a respondent’s social class or race when controlling for all of the
other variables in the models. This finding may suggest that controlling for respondent’s social
class and race are unnecessary when data are properly weighted.59 The internal efficacy variable
has an unexpectedly negative coefficient. This finding suggest that respondents who think the
government is too complicated to understand are more likely to approve of the president than
respondents who do not think the government is too complicated to understand. The external
efficacy variable has the expected coefficient estimate sign (positive) and is statistically
significant. Both efficacy variables have a statistically significant effect on presidential approval
ratings, but most presidential approval studies do not include controls for these variables. Most
studies that do contain both of these variables usually pertain to voting, and not approval of
presidents.60

The ANES over-sampled and under-sampled some portions of the national population during
different survey years. To combat this problem the ANES provides researchers with an
appropriate weight variable to weigh the dataset with. Failing to weigh data correctly, or not at
all, may cause the researcher to report spurious estimates.
60
For an example of a presidential approval study that does specify external efficacy as a
variable, see Ostrom and Simon (1985).
59
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4.4

Conclusion

The results of logistic regression estimation yielded evidence to partially support
Hypothesis 1 and 3, and fully support Hypothesis 2. At an individual-level salient executive
orders had a negative statistically significant effect on presidential approval ratings for members
of both political parties. As the number of salient executive orders issued increases, the
probability of a respondent approving of the president decreases accordingly, ceteris paribus.
This finding holds for salient executive orders no matter which political party a respondent
belongs to; however when the type of executive order is non-salient this finding only holds for
members belonging to the same political party as the president. The amount of non-salient
executive orders issued actually increased the predicted probability of respondents approving of
the president when those respondents identified as being strongly opposite of the president’s
partisan identity (Party ID=1). This anomalous finding is inconsistent with Hypothesis 1 and 3,
and at present, I have no theoretical reason for this finding.
The finding that salient executive orders had a statistically significant effect on
presidential approval ratings at an individual-level warrants future studies to fully explore this
relationship. The individual-level models used in this chapter may suffer from a few design
problems that may be causes for some concern, and future studies may address these issues. One
cause for concern is the lack of fixed-effect variables in this model (Stimson 1985). By pooling
the data, I am unable to control for time period effects within the data without the use of fixed
effect variables; however, due to multicollinearity all fixed effect variables that were initially
included in this study had to be eliminated from the models. Because of this, these models are
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unable to control for wars, rally-around-the-flag-effects, scandals, election years, and more. The
results of this paper may not be generalizable accordingly.
The use of pooling data “have become increasingly common in political science and
other social sciences”; however there are alternative methods that may be better (Lebo and
Weber 2015, 242). One such method that is beyond the scope of this paper is to use an
autoregressive fractionally integrated moving average (ARFIMA) model, and a multi-level
model (MLM) to deal with autocorrelation at the aggregate and individual-levels (Lebo and
Weber 2015, 242-243).” This paper uses two different datasets for the aggregate and individuallevel models. Using the more advanced modeling techniques described above, only one dataset
would be required that could be used to estimate both individual and aggregate-level models.
Doing so, a researcher could use a series of cross section surveys taken over time to model
individual-level effects while controlling for time-varying relationships. Unfortunately, the
logistic regression models estimated in this chapter cannot control for time-varying relationships
at an individual-level due to be pooled.
The executive order variables used in this chapter may also be some cause for concern.
By using ANES cross-sectional data and pooling multiple datasets over time, both executive
order variables do not have a high amount of variation. This is because each variable is the same
for every respondent in a survey year, and with only fifteen survey years this does not yield
much variation in the variable. Future studies that expand the impact that executive orders has on
presidential approval should use monthly data instead of yearly data. Doing so may yield more
variation in a variable that counts the number of executive orders issued by presidents. Because
of the low variation in each executive order variable, both models had difficulty in distinguishing
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each variable from other fixed effect variables. This may have been what caused
multicollinearity in the initial models that estimated fixed effect control variables. By using
ANES surveys, the logistic regression models estimated in this chapter are able to control for
individual-level factors that other surveys may not be able to control for, such as perceptions
about the economy and political efficacy; however, while this chapter demonstrates respondent’s
perceptions about the economy and political efficacy have a statistically significant effect on
presidential approval ratings; the benefits of using ANES data may not outweigh some of the
limitations mentioned here.
This study failed to find evidence of a gender-gap in presidential approval ratings. This
may be because of the time period excluded from this study. Of the fifteen surveys that make up
the pooled dataset, nine of the survey years included Republican presidents. The disparity
between the amount of Republican and Democratic presidents, and the abnormally low approval
ratings for President Carter may be the cause for this study failing to find evidence to support
Expected Finding 5.4. Using survey data that predates 1980 may leave a researcher to find
evidence of the gender gap in presidential approval data. Clarke et al. (2005) find that the gender
gap between men and women’s approval of the president is due to the way men and women
differ in their economic evaluations. This study finds that a gender gap does not exist when
controlling for individual-level factors such as partisan identity, race, political efficacy, and
education, or aggregate-level factors such as divided government. Clarke et al. (2005) control for
fixed effects such as scandals and wars, but do not control for the variables mentioned above.
This finding suggest that there may be homogeneity between men and women in the forces
driving presidential approval ratings.

64

Some may, correctly, argue that by pooling data from 1980-2012 I am limiting my results
by assuming that the effect of variables over time are going to remain constant. A possible
solution to this problem would be to pool the data around individual presidencies.61 Doing so
should allow the effects of variables to change over time instead of remaining constant from
1980-2012. Pooling the data around individual-presidencies using the same variables62 did allow
some variables change over time. In every model created, twelve in total (two for each
presidency), African American was statistically significant. For Democratic presidents African
American was positively signed, and for Republic presidents African American was negatively
signed. This finding suggested that African American respondents were more likely to approve
of Democratic presidents than they were of Republican presidents, not a terribly surprising
finding. This finding differs greatly from the finding of the 1980-2012 pooled data, however, in
which African American was statistically insignificant. Gender had a positive coefficient sign
and was statistically significant during the Carter and Clinton models. For all other models,
Gender was statistically insignificant. This finding is not inconsistent with my original findings
because Gender was statistically insignificant for all but four models.
Consistent with my original findings, in every model salient executive orders had a
statistically significant negative effect on presidential approval ratings. Executive Orders varied

61

Carter (1980), Reagan (1982-1988), Bush (1990-1992), Clinton (1994-2000), G. W. Bush
(2002-2008), and Obama (2012).
62
Creating separate models and datasets for each presidency restricted me from using the divided
government, president party affiliation, and gender interaction variables. Divided government
was a constant in every model except the Clinton and G.W. Bush models; however, including
it in those two models cause extreme multicollinearity. Similarly, the president’s party
affiliation would be a constant in every model, and because of this the gender and president’s
party affiliation interaction variable had to be dropped from every model.
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between each model. For Carter, Executive Orders had a statistically significant negative effect
on presidential approval ratings; however, the interaction effect variable for a respondent’s party
affiliation and the number of executive orders issued had to be dropped from the model due to
extreme multicollinearity.63 For Reagan, the numbers of executive orders issued were not
statistically significant; however, the interaction effect variable for Executive Orders and Party
ID had a positive coefficient and was statistically significant. Similarly to Carter, the Bush
models had to drop the Executive Orders and Party ID interaction effect variable. By doing so,
Executive Orders were found to have a statistically significant positive impact on presidential job
approval ratings. Similarly to Reagan, for Clinton executive orders were not statistically
significant; however, the interaction effect variable for Executive Orders and Party ID had a
positive coefficient and was statistically significant. Similarly to Carter and Bush, in the G. W.
Bush and Obama models the interaction between Executive Orders and Party ID had to be
dropped. For both models Executive Orders had a statistically significant negative effect on
presidential approval ratings.
While it is true pooling data into models for each presidency allowed some variables to
differ over time (African American, Gender, and Executive Orders), and even led to somewhat
different results, these results are suspect due to a number of issues I encountered when
generating the models for each president. The models discussed above were plagued by
multicollinearity issues, and many of the interaction effect variables had to be dropped
accordingly. I was unable to include the divided government variable in any model (including
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Interestingly, mean centering both variables (Executive Orders and Party ID) did not reduce
the VIF scores of any of the three variables.
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the Clinton and G. W. Bush. models) due to multicollinearity. In eight of the models that I
estimated, I had to drop the constant term from the model, because if I did not my executive
orders variables would be dropped from the model. This occurred because in four models (Carter
and Obama) the Executive Orders and Significant Executive Orders variables were constant and
did not have any variation between respondents; the matrix was thus singular. Similarly, in the
rest of the models (Reagan-G.W. Bush) the amount of variation in Executive Orders and
Significant Executive Orders was extremely low. This lack of variation likely caused the
multicollinearity issues discussed above.
Even if the individual-presidency models results were not suspect due to the issues
discussed above, they would still only be specific to individual presidents, and therefore not
generalizable. Pooling the data from 1980-2012 is not ideal, because it necessitates that the
effects of variables do not change over time; however, for the purpose of testing the effects of
executive orders on presidential approval ratings it is a better solution than pooling data around
each presidents time in office. This is the better solution for three reasons: first, it allowed a
greater amount of variation in the executive orders variables than pooling data around each
presidency; second, the 1980-2012 pooled data were not plagued by issues with
multicollinearity; third, the 1980-2012 pooled models were able to control for times of divided
and unified government.
There are a few key implications from the results discovered in this chapter. Besides, the
need for future research to look at how issuing presidents issuing executive orders affect their
approval ratings, future presidential approval models, at an individual-level, should consider
adding internal and external efficacy control variables. This chapter has tentatively demonstrated
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that a respondent’s level of external political efficacy is positively associated with higher
presidential approval, and a respondent’s level of internal political efficacy is negatively
associated with higher presidential approval. If this finding is theoretically valid, then omitting
political efficacy variables may cause a researcher to report spurious estimates due to omitted
variable bias. This thesis chapter highlights the need for proper data collection or data weighing.
Variables controlling for a respondent’s race and social class were statistically insignificant. This
finding implies that respondent’s probability of approving of the president is not affected by their
race or social class. Studies that find race and social class variables to be statistically significant
may suffer from over or under survey sampling, and may not be properly weighing their data.
The next chapter highlights the major overall findings of this thesis and discusses the
implications of these findings for future research.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION
In Chapter 3, two OLS regression fixed-effect models were estimated at an aggregatelevel. Both models employ monthly data, beginning in January 1953; however, due to the data
limitations previously discussed (in Chapter 3), Model 1 includes data through 2012, and Model
2 only includes data through 2002. Both models employ Gallup survey data, and both models
control for several variables: previous monthly presidential job approval ratings; the strength of
the economy; the occurrence of divided government; the presence or absence of honeymoon
periods; scandals; wars; and period effects during each respective president’s administration.
Model 1 did not find support for Hypothesis 1. At an aggregate-level, issuing executive orders
did not have any significant effect on presidential job approval ratings. When controlling for the
issue saliency of executive orders, Model 2 fails to find support for Hypothesis 2. At an
aggregate-level, issuing salient executive orders did not significantly impact on presidential job
approval ratings.
Chapter 4 constructed a pooled cross-section arrangement of data from 1980 to 2012,
using data obtained from The American National Election Study Surveys, to specify two binary
logistic regression models. Both models controlled for the following variables: respondent’s
party identification, age, education, gender, social class, race, internal political efficacy, external
political efficacy, perception of the economy past performance; and outlook of how the economy
will perform in the future. Model 1 also included a control variable for divided government; and
both models contained a control variable for each president’s partisan identity and several
carefully chosen interaction effect variables. Model 1 reports that the number of non-salient
executive orders issued actually increased the predicted probability of respondents’ approving of
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the president when those respondents identified as being strong Democrat and the president was
a Republican, or when respondents identified as being strong Republican when the president was
a Democrat. This finding is anomalous and contradictory to my theory and hypotheses.
Consistent with my theory and hypotheses, when respondents identified as being strongly
aligned with the president’s partisan identity, increasing numbers of non-salient executive orders
decreased the predicted probability of respondents approving of the president. Also consistent
with my theory and hypotheses, Model 2 reports that, at an individual-level, salient executive
orders had a negative statistically significant impact on presidential approval ratings for members
of both political parties. As the number of salient executive orders issued increases, the
probability of a respondent approving of the president decreases accordingly, ceteris paribus.
These seemingly-contradictory findings between both sets of models can be explained by
the differences between the two models. By specifying a series of dummy variables that
represent when each respective president was in office, the aggregate-level (fixed effect) models
are able to control for period effects during each presidents administration; however they are
unable to control for individual-level factors that affect presidential approval ratings. The
individual-level models have demonstrated that partisan affiliation, perceptions about the
economy’s retrospective and prospective performance, age, education, and levels of internal and
external efficacy affect presidential approval ratings.
Respondents who share the same party affiliation as the president were statistically more
likely to approve of the president’s job performance, than were respondents not sharing the same
party affiliation as the president. Respondents who believed the economy performed well in the
past, and respondents who believed the economy will perform better in the future were
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statistically more likely to approve of the president’s job performance than were respondents
who believed the economy performed poorly in the past and respondents who believed the
economy will get worse in the future. Age was demonstrated to have a negative effect on
presidential approval ratings. As age increased, the probability of a respondent’s approving of
the president decreased accordingly. Similarly, as education levels increased, the probability of a
respondent’s approving of the president decreased. Internal political efficacy levels had a
negative effect on presidential approval ratings, suggesting that respondents who think the
government is too complicated to understand are more likely to approve of the president than
respondents who do not think the government is too complicated to understand. External political
efficacy levels were demonstrated to have a positive effect on presidential approval ratings.
Respondents who believed the government would do what is right were statistically more likely
to approve of the president’s job performance, than were respondents who had less faith in the
government to do what is right. Thus, the respondent’s levels of political efficaciousness had
significant impacts on the approval ratings they report.
The aggregate-level models are weakened by a researcher’s not accounting for the
vari0ables discussed above. However, while the individual-level models are able to control for
the variables discussed above, due to the multicollinearity issues, that prevented the specification
of fixed-effect variables, they are unable to control for the same period effects that the aggregatelevel models are able to control for. This shortcoming is not ideal, and it may lower the
generalizability of the individual-level model results. Future researchers, using the methods
described in the previous chapter, may wish to consider including fixed-effect control variables
in their models. Doing so allows researchers to ensure their models are more robust than models
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that do not included fixed-effect control variables. Despite the lack of fixed-effects in the
individual-level models, I believe the individual-level models may be a better theoretical
explanation of presidential approval ratings. I believe this to be the case because the aggregatelevel models may suffer from omitted variable bias due the absence of the variables discussed
above.
Presidential approval ratings are read in Washington and considered approximate to
reality (Gronke and Newman 2003, 501). Higher approval ratings tend to pay of electorally for
the president and his party in Congress and “also affect the president’s policy-making goals,
legislative strategy, and success in promoting his agenda” (Gronke and Newman 2003, 501).64
This impact occurs because presidential approval ratings are a political resource that presidents
and their advisors hope to influence through strategic action (McAvoy 2008, 284).65 If the
finding that the president’s issuing executive orders has a negative effect on presidential job
approval ratings is theoretically valid, as the individual-level models suggest, then the
ramifications of this finding on presidents and future presidential research are indicative of a
structural link in the president’s performance ratings. Like all decisions presidents make,
presidents must think strategically when planning to issue executive orders, because issuing
executive orders that are salient to the public has been demonstrated to have a negative effect on

See also: Sigelman (1979); Newman and Ostrom (2002); and Gronke, Koch, and Wilson
(2003).
65
See also: Bond and Fleisher (1990); Bond, Fleisher, and Wood (2003); and Jacobs and Shapiro
(1994).
64
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presidential approval ratings, ceteris paribus; and even non-salient executive orders may lead the
president to receive lower presidential approval ratings from some members of the public.66
Future presidential approval research that attempts to model approval ratings may wish to
include a variable for executive orders. Newman and Forcehimes (2010) implore researchers to
use their list of significant presidential events because it provides for consistent comparison
across studies and because their selection of events is ostensibly unbiased. I implore researchers
to include Howell’s (2003, 2005) list of significant (salient) executive orders and treat the
issuance of salient executive orders as significant presidential events. Doing so may significantly
enhance the explanatory power of future models. I do not advise researchers to model nonsignificant executive orders in a similar manner as presidential events; however, researchers
should include counts of non-significant executive orders in their models, because they were
demonstrated to have significant effects on approval ratings at an individual-level.
This thesis has found two significant findings that differ from prior research. Chapter 3
demonstrated that past monthly presidential approval ratings do not significantly affect current
presidential approval ratings. This finding is contrary to past research (Nicholson, Segura, and
Woods 2002; Burden and Mughan 2003; Geys and Vermeir 2008; Newman and Forcehimes
2010; Fauvelle-Aymar and Stegmair 2013). The use of potentially non-stationary, and
fractionally integrated data, as well as failing to control for heteroscedasticity, could explain why
prior research found lagged approval ratings to be statistically significant while this analysis does
not. This thesis has failed to find evidence of a gender-gap in presidential approval ratings. There
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As previously discussed, it was demonstrated in Chapter 4 that non-salient executive orders
had a negative effect on respondents belonging to the same political affiliation as the president.
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are a few reasons that could explain why this study did not find evidence of a gender-gap. It is
possible that a gender-gap does not exist when examining the time period used by the individuallevel models. It is also possible the disparity between the amount of Republican and Democratic
presidents, and the abnormally low approval ratings for President Carter may be the underlying
reason for this study’s failing to find evidence of a gender-gap. Of course, it is also possible that
a gender gap does not exist when controlling for individual-level factors such as partisan
identity, race, political efficacy, and education, or aggregate-level factors such as divided
government.
This thesis has also demonstrated the need for future researchers to include control
variables for individual’s levels of efficaciousness. Chapter 4 has tentatively demonstrated that a
respondent’s level of external political efficacy is positively associated with higher presidential
approval, and a respondent’s level of internal political efficacy is negatively associated with
higher presidential approval. Omitting political efficacy variables may cause a researcher to
report spurious estimates due to omitted variable bias, and including political efficacy control
variables should enhance the explanatory power of future models.
This thesis has demonstrated that president’s issuing of executive orders has a significant
effect on the approval ratings they receive from individuals. When the executive order issued is
salient to the public, presidents can expect to receive lower presidential approval ratings from
individuals. This finding is consistent why my theory and hypotheses, and is consistent with the
assumptions of Mayer and Price (2002) and Ouyang (2012). Even non-salient executive orders
were found to have a negative impact on the approval ratings presidents receive from members
of their own party.
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Reeves and Rogowski (2016a, 2016b), and this paper, are important first steps in
advancing literature on how unilateral power use impacts approval ratings, and how the public
reacts to the use of unilateral powers. Reeves and Rogowski (2016a) has demonstrated that
support for unilateral power use is low. They report this finding by conducting six nationally
representative surveys that ask respondents if they agree or disagree with the exercising of
unilateral power by presidents under varying circumstances. Similarly, Reeves and Rogowski
(2016b) use nationally representative surveys to measure support for hypothetical presidential
candidates. The authors report that candidates that pledge to achieve their policy goals through
unilateral power use receive consistently lower approval ratings than candidates that pledge to
achieve their policy goals through congressional legislation.
While the research of Reeves and Rogowski (2016a, 2016b) advance the literature in
theoretically interesting ways, the authors admit the research designs they conducted do not
empirically test the effects the president’s use of unilateral power has on the approval ratings
they receive in real-world instances of unilateral power use. This thesis does empirically test the
effects the president’s issuing of executive orders has on the approval ratings they receive.
Future researcher may wish to improve on the models discussed in this thesis to more rigorously
test the significant relationship found between the president’s issuing of executive orders and the
subsequent approval ratings they receive.
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APPENDIX A: CHAPTER 3 TABLES AND FIGURES
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Table 1. Aggregate-Level Data Descriptive Statistics 1953-2012
Variables
Presidential Approval1
Executive Orders
Salient Executive
Orders
Stock Market Index
Consumer Price Index
Unemployment
Percent Change Stock
Market Index
Percent Change
Consumer Price Index
1

N
719
720

Minimum Maximum
23.00
88.00
0.00
19.00

Mean
54.27
4.37

588
720
720
720

0.00
23.27
26.50
2.50

4.00
1539.66
231.40
10.80

0.28
437.19
103.20
5.93

720

-20.39%

12.02%

0.62%

720
-1.91%
1.80%
Source: Gallup Survey Data.

0.29%
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Table 2. A Frequency Distribution of all Executive Orders 1953-2012
The number of
Executive Orders
Issued in a Month1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
16
17
18
19
Total

Valid Cumulative
Frequency Percent Percent
Percent
15
2.1
2.1
2.1
58
8.1
8.1
10.1
116
16.1
16.1
26.3
118
16.4
16.4
42.6
109
15.1
15.1
57.8
104
14.4
14.4
72.2
70
9.7
9.7
81.9
49
6.8
6.8
88.8
31
4.3
4.3
93.1
19
2.6
2.6
95.7
12
1.7
1.7
97.4
9
1.3
1.3
98.6
3
.4
.4
99.0
1
.1
.1
99.2
2
.3
.3
99.4
1
.1
.1
99.6
1
.1
.1
99.7
1
.1
.1
99.9
1
.1
.1
100.0
720
100.0
100.0
1
Source Howell (2005).
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Table 3. A Frequency Distribution of Salient Executive Orders 1953-2002
The number of
Salient Executive
Orders Issued in a
Month1
0
1
2
3
4
Total

Frequency Percent
457
63.5
105
14.6
20
2.8
5
0.7
1
0.1
588
100
1
Source: Howell (2005).
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Valid
Percent
77.7
17.9
3.4
0.9
0.2
100

Cumulative
Percent
77.7
95.6
99
99.8
100

Figure 1. How Presidential Approval Ratings are Affected by Executive Orders 1953-2012
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Table 4. Mean Presidential Job Approval Ratings by the Number of Executive Orders
Issued 1953-2012
Executive
Orders1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
16
17
18
19
Total

Mean

N

Std.
Deviation

53.45
15
53.97
58
54.4
116
52.12
118
54.59
109
53.75
104
56.42
70
54.47
49
52.24
31
57.76
19
59.53
12
53.07
8
53
3
54
1
68.5
2
70
1
67.75
1
77
1
45.75
1
54.27
719
1
Source: Howell (2005).
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13.407
11.053
11.579
11.773
12.567
12.515
12.846
12.583
12.572
10.672
17.638
13.175
10.817
.
23.335
.
.
.
.
12.296

Figure 2. How Presidential Approval Ratings are Affected by Salient Executive Orders
1953-2012
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Table 5. Mean Presidential Job Approval Ratings by the Number of Salient Executive
Orders Issued 1953-2002
Salient
Executive
Orders1
0
1
2
3
4
Total

Mean

N

55.03
457
57.15
104
61.7
20
61.2
5
72
1
55.71
587
1
Source: Howell (2005).
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Std.
Deviation
11.89
11.542
10.255
12.513
.
11.856

Table 6. Presidential Job Approval Ratings Pearson’s r Correlation Test Results 1953-2012

Pearson Correlation

Sig. (2-Tailed)

N

All Executive Orders1

0.077*

0.04

719

Salient Executive Orders1

0.132**

0.00

587

Lagged Presidential
Approval2

0.930**

0.00

718

Stock Market Index3

-0.186**

0.00

719

Consumer Price Index3

-0.261**

0.00

719

Each Pearson’s r correlation test is with presidential job approval ratings. ** Correlation is
significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed). * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
1
Source: Howell (2005). 2Source: Gallup Survey Data. 3Source: Shiller (2005).
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Table 7. Presidential Job Approval Ratings and Scandals Pearson’s r Correlation Test
Results 1953-2012

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-Tailed)
N
Watergate
-0.264**
0.000
719
Iran Contra
-0.029
0.435
719
Each Pearson’s r correlation test is with presidential job approval ratings. ** Correlation is
significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed). * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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Table 8. Average Presidential Approval Ratings and Average Number of Executive Orders Issued by President 19532012

Presidents
Eisenhower
Kennedy
Johnson
Nixon
Ford
Carter
Reagan
Bush
Clinton
G. W. Bush
Obama

N
95
35
61
67
29
48
96
48
97
96
48

Approval Ratings1
Executive Orders2
Minimum Maximum Mean N Minimum Maximum Mean
49
77
64
96
1
12
4.92
56
79
69.85 35
1
18
6.54
34
78
55
61
1
12
5.11
23
65
49.59 67
0
14
5.3
37
70
47.02 29
1
11
5.24
29
71
44.65 48
1
19
6.42
36
68
52.72 96
0
9
3.89
33
84
59.21 48
0
7
3.33
40
67
54.63 97
0
11
3.73
27
88
49.37 96
0
14
2.96
41
65
49.26 48
0
9
3.04
1
2
Source: Gallup Survey Data. Source: Howell (2005)
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N
96
35
61
67
29
48
96
48
97
12

Salient Executive Orders2
Minimum Maximum Mean
0
3
0.45
0
4
0.63
0
3
0.25
0
3
0.39
0
2
0.21
0
2
0.17
0
2
0.21
0
1
0.15
0
1
0.13
0
2
0.33

Table 9. Robinson’s Gaussian Semiparametric Estimation Procedure

Series

Executive Orders2
Salient Executive
Orders2
Stock Market Index3
Consumer Price
Index3
Unemployment
Military Casualties
(Afghanistan)
Military Casualties
(Iraq)
The Surge
Desert Storm
9/11 Terrorist Attack
Watergate
Iran-Contra Scandal
Honeymoon
Divided Government
Eisenhower
Kennedy
Johnson
Nixon
Ford
Carter
Reagan
Bush
Clinton
G. W. Bush
Obama
Presidential
Approval4

Robinson
Gaussian
H0 :
Semiparametric d=01
Estimate of d

H0:d=11

-0.63

-17

10

-0.81

-20

4.8

0.08

2.21

29

0.22

6.09

33

0.33

9.1

36

-0.44

-12

15

-0.39

-10

16

0.00
-0.18
-0.57
-0.03
-0.24
-0.2
-0.01
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.00
-0.02
-0.01
0.00
-0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00

0.00
-4.98
-15
0.83
-6.65
-5.54
-0.27
0.00
0.00
0.27
0.00
-0.55
-0.55
0.00
-0.27
0.00
0.00
0.00

27
22
11
26
21
22
27
27
27
27
27
27
27
27
27
27
27
27

-0.20

-5.54

22
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1

2

These are the t-ratios of the null hypothesis that d=0 and d=1
Source: Howell (2005). 3Source: Shiller (2005). 4Source: Gallup Survey Data.
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Table 10. Kwiatkowski et al. (KPSS) Unit Root Test Results
Series
L=0

Lag Truncation Parameter (L)
L=10 L=20 L=28
0.15
0.4
0.39 0.37

Executive Orders1
Salient Executive
0.01
0.02 0.03 0.03
Orders1
Stock Market Index2
0.11
0.09 0.08 0.09
Consumer Price
0.31
0.37 0.35 0.32
Index2
Unemployment
0.01
0.01 0.02 0.02
Military Casualties
0.74
1.07 0.71 0.61*
(Afghanistan)
Military Casualties
0.12
0.12 0.09 0.08
(Iraq)
The Surge
0.03
0.03 0.03 0.03
Desert Storm
0
0
0.01 0.02
9/11 Terrorist Attack
0.04
0.05 0.07 0.08
Watergate
0.01
0.01 0.01 0.02
Iran-Contra Scandal
0.05
0.1
0.09 0.09
Honeymoon
0.32
0.07 0.08 0.09
Divided Government
0.02
0.02 0.02 0.03
Eisenhower
0.21
0.22 0.22 0.22
Kennedy
0.02
0.02 0.02 0.02
Johnson
0.04
0.04 0.04 0.04
Nixon
0.04
0.04 0.04 0.04
Ford
0.02
0.02 0.02 0.02
Carter
0.03
0.03 0.03 0.03
Reagan
0.06
0.06 0.06 0.06
Bush
0.03
0.03 0.03 0.03
Clinton
0.06
0.06 0.06 0.06
G. W. Bush
0.06
0.06 0.06 0.06
Obama
0.28
0.28 0.28 0.28
Presidential
0.02
0.02 0.02 0.03
Approval3
1
Source: Howell (2005). 2Source: Shiller (2005). 3Source: Gallup Survey Data.
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Table 11. OLS Regression Estimated Effects on Presidential Job Approval Ratings 19532012 (Model 1) 1953-2002 (Model 2)
Model 1
Variable
Executive Orders1
Salient Executive
Orders1
Stock Market
Index2
Consumer Price
Index2
Unemployment
Military Casualties
(Afghanistan)
Military Casualties
(Iraq)
Surge
Desert Storm
Iraq War
9/11
Watergate
Iran Contra
Honeymoon
Divided
Government
Eisenhower
Kennedy
Johnson
Nixon
Ford
Carter
Reagan
Bush
Clinton
G. W. Bush
Obama
Lagged Approval3
N
Adj. R-Squared

Coeff

Model 2
S.E.
0.06

0.06

Coeff

S.E.
0.12

0.25

0.01**

0

.01*

0.008

-0.69+

0.328

-1.80*

0.83

-0.58

0.91

-0.88

0.99

-0.03+

0.02

2.13

1.53

0.001

0.01

-1.63
1.56
0.832
20.61**
-1.65
-3.33
0.97

1.62
6.38
3.67
0.66
3.46
2.55
0.991

2.15

6.82

22.56**
-1.67
-3.30
1.02

1.33
3.54
2.6
1.03

2.72**

0.58

4.18**

0.58

-75.11**
-69.26**
-54.77
-43.23
2.14
-3.90
2.06
-9.28**
5.62**
2.89**
38.47**
0.12
706
0.27

7.77
6.65
5.65
4.67
3.75
2.58
1.92
1.17
0.62
0.96
2.03
0.07

-79.74**
-72.16**
-56.78**
-46.93**
-1.3
-5.00
-0.51
-11.62**
5.41**
3.51**

8
7.02
5.94
5.01
3.96
2.91
2.187
1.27
0.7
1.15

0.108
585
0.23

0.08
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Standard error of
the estimate

4.28

4.43

Durbin H
-0.06H
0.401
+, significant at 10%; *, significant at 5%; **, significant at 1%, all 2-tailed. Hnon-significant
therefore no serial autocorrelation is present. Coefficients are unstandardized. 1Source: Howell
(2005). 2Source: Shiller (2005). 3Source: Gallup Survey Data.
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Table 12. Individual-Level Data Descriptive Statistics 1980-2012
Variables
N
Minimum Maximum Mean
Presidential Approval
30212
0
1
0.55
Executive Orders
31529
31
82
45.62
Salient Executive
Orders
20570
0
5
2.31
Party ID
31254
1
7
3.96
Age
31529
0
99
45.29
Education
31207
1
4
2.65
Gender
31529
0
1
0.54
Social Class
23828
0
7
2.99
Caucasian
31316
0
1
0.76
African American
31316
0
1
0.12
Hispanic
31316
0
1
0.09
Internal Efficacy
18044
0
1
0.29
External Efficacy
24674
1
5
2.82
Perception of the
Economy (Past)
30929
-1
1
-0.24
Perception of the
Economy (Future)
27411
-1
1
0.08
President’s Party ID
31529
0
1
0.55
Divided Government
31529
0
1
0.85
Executive orders data obtained from Howell (2005). All other data obtained from The American
National Election Studies’ ANES Time Series Cumulative Data File 1948-2012.
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Table 13. The Type of Government (Unified or Divided), Number of Respondents, and
Number of Executive Orders Issued, in Each Survey Year (1980-2012)
Salient
Executive Executive Type of
Year
Frequency Orders
Orders
Government
1980
1614
82
4
Unified
1982
1418
65
4
Divided
1984
2257
49
1
Divided
1986
2176
36
5
Divided
1988
2040
46
1
Divided
1990
1980
43
1
Divided
1992
2488
52
2
Divided
1994
1795
46
5
Unified
1996
1714
50
1
Divided
1998
1281
41
2
Divided
2000
1807
36
0
Divided
2002
1511
52
Divided
2004
1212
42
Unified
2008
2322
31
Divided
2012
5914
43
Divided
Total
31529
714
26
Executive orders data obtained from Howell (2005). All other data obtained from The American
National Election Studies’ ANES Time Series Cumulative Data File 1948-2012.
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Table 14. Mean Comparison Analysis of Presidential Job Approval Ratings and Executive
Orders 1980-2012
Executive
Orders
Mean
31
0.2723
36
0.6546
41
0.748
42
0.4563
43
0.5431
46
0.5623
49
0.6337
50
0.6801
52
0.7186
65
0.5136
82
0.4081
Total
0.552
Executive orders data obtained from Howell (2005). Presidential approval data obtained from
The American National Election Studies’ ANES Time Series Cumulative Data File 1948-2012.
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Table 15. Mean Comparison Analysis of Salient Executive Orders and Presidential
Approval Ratings 1980-2002
Salient
Executive
Orders
Mean
0
0.6715
1
0.639
2
0.5384
4
0.458
5
0.5869
Total
0.5872
Executive orders data obtained from Howell (2005). Presidential approval data obtained from
The American National Election Studies’ ANES Time Series Cumulative Data File 1948-2012.
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Table 16. Mean Comparison Analysis of Party ID and Presidential Approval Ratings
(1980-2012)
Party ID
Mean
Strong Opposite
0.1705
Mild Opposite
0.3829
Weak Opposite
0.294
Neutral (Independent) 0.5441
Weak Same
0.7761
Mild Same
0.7907
Strong Same
0.9203
Total
0.5519
Data obtained from The American National Election Studies’ ANES Time Series Cumulative
Data File 1948-2012.

97

Table 17. Mean Comparison Analyses of Past Performance of the Economy and
Presidential Approval Ratings, and Future Performance of the Economy and Presidential
Approval Ratings 1980-2012
Past Performance of the
Economy
Mean

Future Performance of the
Economy
Mean

Worse
0.3728
0.4099
Stay(ed) the same
0.6207
0.5411
Better
0.8226
0.686
Total
0.5512
0.5558
Data obtained from The American National Election Studies’ ANES Time Series Cumulative
Data File 1948-2012.
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Table 18. Mean Comparison Analysis of Divided Government and Presidential Approval
Ratings 1980-2012
Divided
Government Mean
Unified
0.4796
Divided
0.5642
Total
0.552
Data obtained from The American National Election Studies’ ANES Time Series Cumulative
Data File 1948-2012.
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Table 19. Mean Comparison Analysis of Gender and Presidential Approval Ratings 19802012
Respondent
Gender
Mean
N
Male
0.5321
6338
Female
0.5903
7267
Total
0.5632
13606
Republican
Male
0.5701
7545
Female
0.5201
9061
Total
0.5428
16607
Total
Male
0.5528
13883
Female
0.5513
16329
Total
0.552
30212
Data obtained from The American National Election Studies’ ANES Time Series Cumulative
Data File 1948-2012.
President Party ID
Democrat
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Table 20. Logistic Regression Estimated Effects on Presidential Job Approval Ratings
1980-2012 (Model 1) 1980-2002 (Model 2)

Variable

Model 1
S.E. Sig.

B
1

Executive Orders

0

0

0.94

VIF

Model 2
S.E. Sig.

B

VIF

1.92

Salient Executive Orders

-0.182

0.02

0

1.47

0.536

0.01

0

1.07

Party ID1

0.589

0.01

0

1.1

EO*Party ID1

-0.003

0

0

1.04

Age
Education
Gender
Social Class
White
Black
Hispanic
Internal Efficacy
External Efficacy
Economic Perception
of the Economy (Past)
Economic Perception
of the Economy (Future)
President’s Party ID
Divided Government
Gender*President’s Party
ID
Constant

-0.004
-0.148
0.164
-0.007
-0.045
-0.026
0.157
-0.272
0.092

0
0.03
0.07
0.01
0.13
0.14
0.15
0.05
0.02

0
0
0.01
0.61
0.73
0.86
0.29
0
0

1.1
1.35
2.19
1.26
6.08
4.34
3.31
1.17
1.19

-0.004
-0.127
0.212
0.009
-0.056
-0.251
0.111
-0.261
0.063

0
0.03
0.08
0.02
0.15
0.17
0.18
0.06
0.02

0.01
0
0.01
0.55
0.72
0.13
0.53
0
0

1.1
1.36
2.78
1.25
7
5.09
3.55
1.18
1.17

0.849

0.03

0

1.25

0.69

0.03

0

1.19

0.12

0.03

0

1.15

0.114

0.03

0

1.12

0.751
0.24

0.07
0.09

0
0.01

2.75
2.4

0.522

0.08

0

2.65

-0.269

0.09

0

3.36

-0.321

0.1

0

3.94

0.324

0.17

0.06

-1.139

0.2

0

Cox & Snell R Square
Nagelkerke R-Square

0.321
0.428

0.278
0.373

Percentage of Cases
76.50%
Correctly Classified
Cases Included in
12967
Analysis
Missing Cases
18559
Total Cases
31526
1
This variable is mean centered in Model 1.

74.80%
10273
21253
31526
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Executive orders data obtained from Howell (2005). All other data obtained from The American
National Election Studies’ ANES Time Series Cumulative Data File 1948-2012.
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Table 21. Predicted Probability of Approving of the President When Executive Orders and
Party ID Vary (Model 1) 1980-2012
Party ID (-3
Party ID (3
Executive
“Strong
Party ID (0
“Strong
1
Orders
Opposite”)
“Independent”) Same”)
-14.63
0.293
0.7346
0.9487
-9.63
0.3025
0.7346
0.9464
-4.63
0.312
0.7346
0.9441
-3.63
0.314
0.7346
0.9436
-2.63
0.3159
0.7346
0.9431
0.37
0.3218
0.7346
0.9417
3.37
0.3277
0.7346
0.9402
4.37
0.3297
0.7346
0.9397
6.37
0.3337
0.7346
0.9386
19.37
0.3602
0.7346
0.9315
36.37
0.3961
0.7346
0.9211
Total
0.3214
0.7346
0.9416
1
In Model 1 Executive Orders and Party ID are mean centered. The actual mean should be 0.00
instead of 0.37 (0.37 is the result of a rounding error when subtracting the mean from Executive
Orders in SPSS).
All other interval-level variables were held at their mean. Ordinal-level variables were held at
their median value, and nominal-level variables were held at their modal value.
Executive orders data obtained from Howell (2005). All other data obtained from The American
National Election Studies’ ANES Time Series Cumulative Data File 1948-2012.
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Table 22. Predicted Probability of Approving of the President When Salient Executive
Orders and Party ID Vary (Model 2) 1980-2002
Salient Executive Party ID (1 "Strong
Party ID (4
Party ID (7 "Strong
Orders
Opposite")
"Independent")
Same")
0
0.3932
0.7639
0.9417
1
0.3507
0.7295
0.9309
2
0.3105
0.6921
0.9182
4
0.2383
0.6097
0.8864
5
0.2069
0.5656
0.8667
Average
0.3027
0.6764
0.9105
All other interval-level variables were held at their mean. Ordinal-level variables were held at
their median value, and nominal-level variables were held at their modal value.
Executive orders data obtained from Howell (2005). All other data obtained from The American
National Election Studies’ ANES Time Series Cumulative Data File 1948-2012.
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Table 23. Predicted Probability of Approving of the President by Gender and the
President's Party Affiliation (Model 1) 1980-2012
President Partisan
Identity
Female Male
Democrat
0.63
0.59
Republic
0.73
0.75
Total
0.69
0.68
All other interval-level variables were held at their mean. Ordinal-level variables were held at
their median value, and nominal-level variables were held at their modal value.
Data obtained from The American National Election Studies’ ANES Time Series Cumulative
Data File 1948-2012.
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